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Abstract
We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertempo-
ral exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity
markets while engaging in non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. In a setting
with subjective uncertainty over future prices, we show that perfectly contracted equi-
librium outcomes are a subset of Pareto optimal allocations. It is a robust possibility
for perfectly contracted equilibrium outcomes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
outcomes. We show that both centralized banking and retrading with bilateral con-
tracting can lead to perfectly contracted equilibria.
Keywords: equilibrium, future prices, uncertainty, contracts.
JEL classification: D5, D70, D72, D84
∗We thank Huaxia Zeng for research support and helpful comments. Chatterji acknowledges support from
SMU research grant 11-C-244-SMU-003. We thank Murali Agastya, Madhav Aney, Srihari Govindan, Bryce
Hool, Atsushi Kajii, Hamid Sabourian, and participants at the ESAM 2012 session where this paper was
presented for helpful comments. Correspondence: Shurojit Chatterji, shurojitc@smu.edu.sg and Sayantan
Ghosal, Sayantan.Ghosal@glasgow.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
In an Arrow-Debreu economy (Arrow [1953], Debreu [1959], Arrow and Debreu [1954]),
when agents trade Arrow-Debreu contingent contracts, equilibrium resolves all uncertainty
(i.e. uncertainty over future states of the world and uncertainty over future prices). In the
formulation of an equilibrium of a sequence economy where securities replace markets for
contingent claims, Arrow [1953] and Radner [1972] adopt the notion of a rational expectations
equilibrium where agents are assumed to know at each date the map between future realized
states and future equilibrium commodity and asset prices. Thus, in such an equilibrium with
securities the realized state must resolve all uncertainty including the uncertainty of future
prices.
This paper examines trade in a simple two period economy without uncertainty over states
of the world. The Radner formulation alluded to above specializes to the notion of a perfect
foresight equilibrium where agents trade a security competitively and have perfect foresight
over future spot market prices. Under these conditions, the allocations arising out of Radner
equilibria coincide with Arrow-Debreu allocations. We study the model without insisting
that intertemporal transfers be organized via a security market where agents necessarily
trade competitively and, importantly, we do not impose perfect foresight.1
Agents operate under subjective uncertainty over future prices: they need not agree on the
distribution of future prices, and are compelled to make decisions on the basis of their beliefs
over future prices. This is the model studied in the literature on temporary equilibrium in
security markets which studies the case where securities are traded competitively. It is known
(Green [1973]) that a temporary equilibrium exists only under restrictive conditions on the
support of agent’s beliefs over future prices. Moreover, even when a temporary equilibrium
exists, the resulting allocations need not be optimal. Given that we include configurations
where a temporary equilibrium need not exist when all markets (the respective spot markets
and the security market) are competitive and given our focus on optimality, we study the
model without insisting that intertemporal transfers be organized via a security market where
agents necessarily trade competitively. In our paper, trading under conditions of subjective
uncertainty over future prices is accomplished by supplementing spot trade in commodities
with contracts over future prices that belong to a price set that at least one agent deems
likely to occur. Under our contracts, an agent who receives wealth in period one, commits
1That the assumption of perfect foresight is extraordinarily strong is a view expressed by various scholars.
A case in point is Radner’s own critique of perfect foresight (Radner [1972], page 142). Exploring the
possibilities for dynamic resource allocation without this assumption as we do in this paper appears to be
an avenue worth exploring. The Radner equilibrium arises as a special case of our formulation where agents
are subjectively certain about the prices that support the Arrow-Debreu allocation and the asset is traded
competitively. In the terminology of Arrow and Hahn [1999], our sequential economy is essential.
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to a delivery of wealth in period two that is contingent on the spot prices prevailing in
the period two market. An integral feature of the model we propose is that agents behave
simultaneously as Walrasian agents in the spot markets, but in a non-Walrasian manner in
the contracting process. We define a notion of equilibrium, perfectly contracted equilibrium,
for an exchange economy where commodities are traded competitively in spot markets and
agents contract over future prices that belong to a specific price set. Our equilibrium concept
takes cognizance of the interaction between the contracting process and the markets where
agents act as Walrasian agents, and requires market clearing while requiring the contracts
emerging from the non-Walrasian interaction to be individually rational and efficient.
In our setting where there is no uncertainty in the fundamentals (preferences and endow-
ments) in the underlying exchange economy, we are interested in allocations that are Pareto
optimal. We show that a subset of Pareto optimal allocations, called attainable allocations,
can be obtained as perfectly contracted allocations. For an attainable allocation to emerge as
an perfectly contracted allocation, we require that agents contract over a price set such that
the agents who give up wealth in period one attach sufficiently high probability to this price
set and furthermore, this price set contains the price vector that supports the attainable
allocation. A consequence of our formulation of attainability is that there are no restrictions
on the price forecasts of agents who receive wealth in the first period; consequently in our
model the forecasts of agents may be rather disparate. In particular, agents need not agree
on the sets of prices that receive positive probability under their respective expectations. By
example, we show that it is a robust possibility for (i) perfectly contracted equilibrium out-
comes to differ from Arrow-Debreu equilibrium outcomes; (ii) perfectly contracted equilibria
exist even when the unique Arrow-Debreu price does not belong to the commonly forecasted
price set.
Traditionally, adverse selection and moral hazard problems have been analyzed by intro-
ducing contracts in general equilibrium models (e.g. Bisin and Gottardi (1999, 2006)). In
our model there is a somewhat more primitive role for introducing contracts and it is tied
to the fact that agents need not have perfect foresight of future prices. Our equilibrium
notion delivers Pareto optimal allocations but does so while embodying a weaker consistency
condition on forecasts than in previous formulations, namely that the second period market
price resulting from contracting and market clearing belong to the set of prices agents have
contracted over. This ensures that agents giving up wealth in the first period under the
contracts are “correct” in their prediction that the second period price belongs to the set of
prices they believe will prevail. The model thus shows that for Pareto optimal allocations
to result from intertemporal trade, one does not need perfect foresight; what is needed is
that agents be able to write contracts that exhaust gains to trade conditional on particular
second period prices arising in the future. This in our setting is accomplished via perfect
contracting in price contingent contracts.
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In our formulation, if a second period price belongs to the set of prices agents contract
over, it reflects the fact that agents believe that this price might arise in the second period
spot market, and if it does, they can trade their demand at this price. The agents thus
disregard feasibility issues as agents in a Walrasian setting ought to in order to be price
takers. In the contracting process, agents are assumed to interact with other spot market
price takers in a non-Walrasian setting and here the contracts they exchange2 are constrained
by their endowments. We require these contracts to be individually rational and efficient
in that they equate the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution across agents (these
concepts are made precise in Section 2.2). The assumption that the contracts over prices
written by agents are efficient and individually rational requires economy-wide coordination
between agents. We first show that these contracts are readily computed by a centralized
institution (central bank) by maximizing the weighted sum of indirect utilities subject to
individual rationality constraints. We next show that a decentralized process of bilateral
contracting with an element of retrading can also achieve the required level of coordination
to implement the contracts studied by us. It bears mentioning that the contracts generating
attainable allocations are chosen even though the centralised institution3 or any pair of
matched pair of agents with bilateral contracting are not constrained to choosing contracts
that generate feasible demands.4 This feature affirms further the relevance of attainable
allocations in our intertemporal resource allocation problem.
Our formulation of contracts over future prices is distinct from, and complements the
analysis of “Endogenous Uncertainty” (Kurz [1974] introduced the term to describe it). To
deal with the issue of price uncertainty, Kurz [1974a] proposed that agents trade this un-
certainty using Price Contingent Contracts (PCC). Further work along this line includes
2The market clearing prices in the markets where the agents act as price takers are in turn affected by
these non-Walrasian contracts. The model reflects a feature of trade in market environments where agents
act as price takers in many markets but do exercise market power in bilateral negotiations or negotiations
within small groups of agents. Ghosal and Polemarchakis [1997] introduce a related class of models in a
general equilibrium setting where agents are price takers but also simultaneously choose strategies.
3We note that our formulation of the maximization problem that the central bank solves is distinct from
the maximization problem of a conventional central planner whose objective is to obtain a Pareto optimal
allocation by maximizing a weighted sum of utilities. This is because in our model after the central bank
selects a contract, agents act as Walrasian price takers and the central bank, unlike a conventional central
planner, ignores the issues of feasibility that would arise when agents post their Walrasian demands after
the contracts are executed.
4Levich (2009) notes the role of bilateral transactions in trading of complex derivatives and how a private
institution (the CLS Bank) developed to mitigate counterparty risks. We interpret centralized banking as
such a bank that has a large client (the coalition of all agents). In electricity markets most structured
contracts are traded bilaterally rather than over the counter (Ripple [2011]). In both cases, these agents
may also trade competitively in other markets. Contracts over future prices are a common feature in the
planning of projects involving large-scale investment to hedge against the risk of fluctuating demand and
price risk by natural resource companies, manufacturers and football clubs.
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Svensson [1981], Henrotte [1996], Kurz [1993], Kurz and Wu [1996]5. The key differences
between our work and this literature is that in our paper contracts over future prices are not
themselves traded in competitive markets and moreover, such contracts are limited to only
those prices that belong to a price set.
In an intertemporal economy, when future spot prices are indexed by a sunspot variable,
what is the link, if any, between the model and results reported here and those in the literature
on sunspots6? We first note that there is no randomness in our definition of a perfectly
contracted equilibrium; in contrast, whenever sunspot equilibria differ from the certainty
equilibria, equilibrium allocations are non-trivially random. The literature on sunspots also
assumes that the realization of extrinsic uncertainty fixes the price forecasts of agents. Our
model can be used to construct a variant of sunspot equilibria where the sunspot variable
does not pin down a specific price forecast but allows for subjective diversity in forecasts of
future prices of the sort that we have described in the description of perfectly contracted
equilibrium (see Arrow and Hahn [1999]). Perfect contracting, conditional on the realization
of an extrinsic variable, will then lead to stochastic but ex post Pareto optimal allocations
in a set up where extrinsic variables affect expectations by affecting the set of prices that
agents’ contract over but do not fully determine a specific price forecast accross agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the formal
model, states and proves the key result of the paper, and examines the distinction between a
perfectly contracted equilibrium and an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the context of a simple
but robust example. Section 3 studies aspects of contracting processes that lead to perfectly
contracted equilibria. Section 4 contains results on centralized contracting and bilateral
contracting. The last section concludes. All proofs of the results reported in the main text
are gathered in the Appendix.
5Kurz and Wu [1996] study a dynamic stochastic overlapping generations economy with complete com-
petitive markets for trading price uncertainty. They draw a connection between Rational beliefs equilibrium
(a weaker notion than rational expectations), and a particular notion of Pareto optimality. Our work is moti-
vated by similar concerns, but our formal models and hypotheses are very different. Beliefs are in our setting
price forecasts and we impose no consistency condition on beliefs of the sort used in the aforementioned
paper.
6A large literature, building on the seminal paper by Cass and Shell [1983], studies the allocation properties
of sunspot equilibria where the allocation of resources depends on some purely extrinsic random variable - a
random variable that has no effect on the fundamentals.
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2 The model and some results
2.1 A two period exchange economy
We analyze a two period economy with a finite number of agents and finitely many com-
modities in each of the two periods. The set of commodities in period one is M = {1, ...,M},
indexed by m = 1, ...,M , M ≥ 1; the set of commodities in period two is N = {1, ..., N},
indexed by n = 1, ..., N , N ≥ 2; the set of agents is I = {1, ..., I}, indexed by i = 1, ..., I. A
consumption plan for agent i is a vector xi = (xi1, x
i
2) = ((x
i
11, ...x
i
1M), (x
i
21, ...x
i
2N)) ∈ <M+N+ ,
∀i ∈ I. The endowment of each agent i is represented as ωi = (ωi1, ωi2) ∈ <M+N+ , ∀i ∈ I. An
allocation is a vector (x1, x2) = ((x
i
1)i∈I , (x
i
2)i∈I). The endowment vector of the economy is
given by (ω1, ω2) = ((ω
i
11, ...ω
i
1M)i∈I , (ω
i
21, ...ω
i
2N)i∈I).
We make the following assumptions and these will be maintained throughout the paper.
A 1 The preferences of each agent i is represented by a utility function U i(xi1, x
i
2) = u
i
1(x
i
1)+
ui2(x
i
2), ∀i ∈ I, where at each t = 1, 2, uit(·) is strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave and
at each xit  0, is twice continuously differentiable.
A 2 The aggregate endowment vector of the economy satisfies
∑
i∈I ω
i  0 with ωi > 0,
∀i ∈ I.
The assumption of time separable utilities simplifies the exposition considerably. It is
possible to extend the analysis of the paper to the case where this assumption does not hold.
A spot price in period one is an M -vector p1 > 0 that belongs to P1 = {l ∈ <M+ |lM = 1}
where the price of the last commodity is normalized to one and analogously, a spot price
in period two is an N -vector p2 > 0 that belongs to P2 = {l ∈ <N+ |lN = 1}. We model
subjective uncertainty over future prices as follows: each agent i is endowed with a function
φi(p1) which maps P1 into the space of probability distributions on P2. The support of this
probability distribution will be denoted suppφi(p1), ∀i ∈ I.7
2.2 Contracts and perfectly contracted equilibria
Before proceeding to a description of contracts, we note that in the absence of an asset or
contracts, at a given period one spot price p1 ∈ P1, an agent solves in period one the problem
Max ui1(x
i
1) subject to p1 · xi1 ≤ p1 · ωi1. Analogously, in period two, given a price p2 ∈ P2,
the agent solves the problem Max ui2(x
i
2) subject to p2 ·xi2 ≤ p2 ·ωi2. The respective solutions
7Here, “supp” denotes the support of a probability distribution.
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to these problems are denoted ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1) and ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2). We will employ the same
notation for the solutions to these problems when p1 and p2 are non-negative price vectors
in RM+ and R
N
+ which are not normalized to lie in P1 and P2 respectively.
We model a scenario where at a current price p1 ∈ P1, agents contract over a set of period
two spot prices Π that at least one agent deems is likely to occur, i.e., Π ∩ suppφi(p1) 6= ∅
for some i ∈ I.
We first introduce the notion of a price contingent allocation. For a given Π ⊂ P2, a price
contingent allocation with respect to Π specifies (z1, z2(p2)) where z
i
1 ∈ <M+ is a vector of
period one commodities for each i ∈ I, and for each p2 ∈ Π, zi2(p2) ∈ <N+ is vector of period
two commodities for each i ∈ I. The following is our notion of a contract.
Definition 1 Given a set of second period prices Π ⊂ P2, a contract, denoted sΠ, is a price
contingent allocation (z1, z2(p2)) with respect to Π such that
(i)
∑
i∈I z
i
1 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
1;
(ii)
∑
i∈I z
i
2(p2) =
∑
i∈I ω
i
2, ∀p2 ∈ Π;
(iii) zi2(p2) = ω
i
2, ∀i ∈ I if p2 /∈ Π.
In our formulation, the process of contracting over prices is embedded in the Walrasian ad-
justment process as follows. Given a period one price p1, the profile of expectation functions
(φi)i∈I determines what prices agents expect might prevail in the period two spot markets.
Before the agents announce their demands at p1, they explore the possibility of writing price
contingent contracts over some set Π ⊂ P2 of period two prices with other agents in order to
transfer wealth across the two dates in a mutually beneficial manner given their expectations
over future prices. A contract specifies a reallocation of the first period endowments and a
price contingent reallocation of second period endowments among the agents. We do not ad-
dress here the specific story underlying how such a contract is reached.8 Our intention here is
to specify conditions on the contracts that emerge out of this contracting process that ensure
Pareto optimality under the equilibrium concept that we propose for this model. At the end
of this contracting phase, the first period endowments are exchanged so that z1 becomes
the endowment vector in period one (if some agent i does not enter into any contract, then
zi1 = ω
i
1). Given this new endowment, agents announce their utility maximizing demands at
the price p1. Of course, p1 need not induce market clearing at these demands, in which case
the auctioneer announces a different period one price and the process repeats itself. In period
two, if a second period spot price p2 ∈ Π is realized, then the agents exchange endowments
8This may be the result of some non-cooperative procedure or some cooperative process. We defer a
discussion of such processes to Section 3 below.
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in accordance with z2(p2) and then place their utility maximizing demands. If p2 /∈ Π, each
agent i ∈ I announces her utility maximizing demand with endowment fixed at ωi2.
We now turn to a description of what agents believe they can consume if they agree on
a contract sΠ in period one given a spot price p1 ∈ P1. At a period one price p1 ∈ P1,
for each p2 ∈ P2, we associate to a contract sΠ, the price contingent vector ξi(p, sΠ) =
(ξi1(p1, sΠ), ξ
i
2(p2, sΠ)), ∀i ∈ I, which is constructed as follows. For each i ∈ I, let ξi1(p1, sΠ)
be the solution to Max ui1(x
i
1) subject to p1 · xi1 ≤ p1 · zi1. Given p2 ∈ P2, (i) if p2 ∈ Π,
define ξi2(p2, sΠ) as the solution to Max u
i
2(x
i
2) subject to p2 · xi2 ≤ p2 · zi2(p2); (ii) else define
ξi2(p2, sΠ) as the solution to Max u
i
2(x
i
2) subject to p2 · xi2 ≤ p2 · ωi2.
For a particular contract to be agreed upon at a period one price p1, it must satisfy some
form of individual rationality for each agent. We now turn to our formulation of individual
rationality. The first part of our individual rationality requirement is that for each p2 ∈ Π, the
indirect utility of accepting sΠ for each agent exceeds the indirect utility of not accepting the
contract. The second part of the individual rationality requirement pertains to the subset of
agents who give up wealth in period one for a price contingent amount in the second period.9
If a contract sΠ such that z1 6= ω1 is accepted by all agents at the price p1, there is a subset
of agents, denoted I−(p1, z1), for whom one has p1 · ωi1 > p1 · zi1, ∀i ∈ I−(p1, z1). However,
if the second period price does not belong to Π they have contracted over, they receive no
compensation for the wealth they give up in period one. For these agents to want to accept
such a contract, it must be that Π receives “enough” probability under their beliefs so that
in expected utility terms, their payoff of accepting the contract is no less than their utility
of not doing so.
Definition 2 The contract sΠ is individually rational at p1 if
(i) ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, sΠ)) + u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2, sΠ)) ≥ ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1))) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)), ∀p2 ∈ Π and
∀i ∈ I.
(ii) ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, sΠ))+
∫
P2 u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2, sΠ))dφ
i(p1) ≥ ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, p1·ωi1)))+
∫
P2 u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2, p2·ωi2))dφi(p1),
∀i ∈ I−(p1, z1).
Observation 1 We note that the individually rationality requirement implies that sΠ must
be such that Π ∩ suppφi(p1) 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ I−(p1, z1), i.e., the set of period two prices the agents
contract over have non-empty intersection with the set of prices that get positive probability
under the expectations of all agents belonging to I−(p1, z1). If one assumes that for all agents
in I−(p1, z1), the support of the expectations functions are identical and are given by Π, then
one can dispense with Condition (ii) of the individual rationality requirement. Our proof
9We discuss an alternative notion of individual rationality in Subsection 2.5 below.
8
of the Theorem that follows and subsequent examples will exploit this fact and verify only
Condition (i) of Definition 2 in order to establish the individual rationality of contracts. 
Our final requirement is that contracting be efficient. This states that given a period one
price p1 ∈ P1, the contract should be such that for any pair of agents i, j, for every price
pair p = (p1, p2), p2 ∈ Π, they have contracted over, their intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution for some pair of commodities, should be equalized when evaluated at the bundles
they anticipate they will consume at that price pair. Thus the marginal rates of substitution
are evaluated at the bundles ξi(p, sΠ) that the agents anticipate they will consume if they
accept the contract and if the price pair p is realized. As such Walrasian perceptions may
not satisfy feasibility, there is no guarantee that an efficient will actually result in a Pareto
optimal allocation: this will be a property of the equilibrium concept defined by us below.
Definition 3 A contract sΠ is efficient at p1 if for any i, j ∈ I and ∀p2 ∈ Π, we have
MRSiq,r(ξ
i(p, sΠ)) = MRS
j
q,r(ξ
j(p, sΠ)) for some q ∈M and r ∈ N .
These consumption plans ξi(p, sΠ) are merely Walrasian perceptions of what agents be-
lieve they can purchase at the spot price pair p = (p1, p2) if they agree on the contract sΠ.
These plans may not of course be feasible. They will however be feasible at the equilibrium
that we will propose for this model. For our notion of an equilibrium in this formulation,
we work with a price pair p = (p1, p2) and a contract that satisfies the individual rationality
and efficiency requirements. A price pair and an individually rational, efficient contract con-
stitute an equilibrium provided that p1 clears markets when agents period one demands are
given by ξi1(p1, sΠ), p2 clears second period markets when the period two demands are given
by ξi2(p2, sΠ), and importantly, p2 actually belongs to set Π that the agents had contracted
over.
Definition 4 A perfectly contracted equilibrium is a triple (p∗, x∗, sΠ) comprising a price
vector p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2), an allocation x
∗ and a contract sΠ = (z1, z2(p2)) that is an efficient and
individually rational contract at p∗1, such that
(i) p∗2 ∈ Π.
(ii) x∗i1 = ξ
i
1(p
∗
1, sΠ), ∀i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I x
∗i
1 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
1.
(iii) x∗i2 = ξ
i
2(p
∗
2, sΠ), ∀i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I x
∗i
2 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
2.
An allocation x∗ that is part of a perfectly contracted equilibrium will be referred to as a
perfectly contracted allocation.
We conclude this subsection by defining attainable allocations; these are a subset of Pareto
optimal allocations. By the assumption that each agents utility is separable over time, we
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can define the period t economy, t = 1, 2, as the static economy where the endowment
vector is ωt and each agent’s utility is u
i
t(x
i
t), ∀i ∈ I. Consider a Pareto optimal allocation
x = (x1, x2)  0. The subvector xt, t = 1, 2, is Pareto optimal in the period t economy.
Note that in each period t economy, given that preferences are assumed to be convex and
xt  0, t = 1, 2, there exists a price vector pt(x) ∈ Pt that supports the subvector xt as a
Walrasian allocation in the period t economy provided the endowment vector ωt is suitably
redistributed.
Given the Pareto optimal allocation x = (x1, x2)  0, interpret the supporting price
subvectors p1(x) and p2(x) as spot prices and recall that ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · ωi1) is the solution
to Max ui1(x
i
1) subject to p1(x) · xi1 ≤ p1(x) · ωi1 and ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · ωi2) is the solution to
Max ui2(x
i
2) subject to p2(x) · xi2 ≤ p2(x) · ωi2. Finally, let U ix = ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · ωi1)) +
ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · ωi2)). We now have the following definition.
Definition 5 The Pareto optimal allocation x  0 is attainable if U i(xi) ≥ U ix, ∀i ∈ I. It
is strongly attainable if the inequality is strict for each individual i ∈ I.
Observation 2 The restriction of attainability rules out some Pareto optimal allocations
that are individually rational in the “usual” sense, in that they give at least as much utility as
the utility associated with the endowment point of each agent. In Section 3.1.1, we provide
an example of a Pareto optimal allocation that is individually rational in the usual sense but
is not attainable. 
In Subsection 2.3 below we present examples of perfectly contracted allocations. In
Subsection 2.4, we provide a characterization of perfectly contracted allocations.
2.3 An example
We illustrate the concepts introduced in the previous Subsection using a simple example. We
show examples of Pareto optimal allocations other than the unique Arrow-Debreu allocation
of the economy that arise as perfectly contracted allocations. In particular we show an
example where the economy admits a perfectly contracted equilibrium, but the Arrow-Debreu
allocation does not arise as a perfectly contracted allocation because expectations are not
suitably configured.
The economy we study here is as follows. The set of agents is I = {1, 2}. There is one
commodity in period one and two in period two. Thus M = {x11} and N = {x21, x22}. The
endowments are ω11 = ω
2
1 = 1, ω
1
2 = (1, 0), ω
2
2 = (0, 1); accordingly, ω
1 = (1, 1, 0); ω2 =
(1, 0, 1). The utilities of the two agents are U1(x111, x
1
21, x
1
22) = ln x
1
11 +α lnx
1
21 +(1−α) lnx122,
and U2(x211, x
2
21, x
2
22) = lnx
2
11 + β lnx
2
21 + (1− β) lnx222 respectively, where 0 < α, β < 1.
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We first compute the Arrow-Debreu solution by postulating that markets are complete.
There are three prices. Normalizing by p11, these prices are 1, θ21, θ22. The Walrasian demands
of agent 1 are x1d11 =
1
2
(1 + θ21);x
1d
21 =
α
2
(1 + 1
θ21
);x1d22 =
1−α
2
(1+θ21
θ22
) with similar expressions
for the demands of agent 2. Imposing market clearing and solving gives the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium prices as θ21 =
α+3β
2+β−α ; θ22 =
4−3α−β
2+β−α . The Arrow-Debreu allocation is x
1AD =
( 1+2β
2+β−α ,
α(1+2β)
α+3β
, (1−α)(1+2β)
4−3α−β ) and x
2AD = ( 3−2α
2+β−α ,
β(3−2α)
α+3β
, (1−β)(3−2α)
4−3α−β ). Since 0 < α, β < 1, one
has in particular that 0 < x2AD11 < 1;x
1AD
11 > 1 whenever α + β > 1.
We now turn to a description of the set of attainable allocations. Recall that a Pareto
optimal allocation x 0 is attainable if U i(x) ≥ U ix, i = 1, 2. At a Pareto optimal allocation,
x1 = (x111, x
1
21, x
1
22)  0 and x2 = (2 − x111, 1 − x121, 1 − x122)  0 satisfy x
1
11
2−x111 =
βx121
α(1−x121) =
(1−β)x122
(1−α)(1−x122) . For attainability, such an allocation must additionally satisfy the two inequalites
lnx111 + lnx
1
21 ≥ lnα and ln(2− x111) + ln(1− x121) + lnαx122 − ln(1− α)x121 ≥ ln β.
We now study perfectly contracted equilibria for this economy. Since there is only one
commodity in period one, we set p1 = 1. The set of second period prices is P2 = {(q, 1)|q ≥ 0}.
In this framework, Π will be an interval of values of q. We specify Π = [q,q] such that q > 1
and assume that suppφi(p1) = Π, i = 1, 2. This will allow us to dispense with Condition (ii)
in the definition of individual rationality (Definition 2) and simplify the exposition.
Since there is only one good in period one, in the absence of contracting, the agent
consumes ωi11, i = 1, 2. Thus ξ
i
1(1, ω
i
1) = ω
i
11, i = 1, 2. As before, ξ
i
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ωi2) denotes
the solution to Max ui2(x
i
2) subject to (q, 1) · xi2 ≤ (q, 1) · ωi2, ∀(q, 1) ∈ P2, i = 1, 2. These are
ξ
1
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω12) = (α, q(1 − α)) and ξ
2
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω22) = (β/q, 1 − β). These are the
consumption bundles the agent expects to be consume if the price in period two is q. (As
remarked before, these plans will of course for an arbitrary q not be feasible.)
Observe that for a given q ∈ Π = [q, q], MRS1x11x21(ω111, ξ
1
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω12)) = 1 while
MRS2x11x21(ω
2
11, ξ
2
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω22)) = 1/q. Thus if q ∈ Π, then q > 1, and so
MRS1x11x21(ω
1
11, ξ
1
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω12)) > MRS2x11x21(ω211, ξ
2
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω22)),
and the agents can improve over the no contract utility level using a contract under which
agent 1 gets some x11 in period one and gives up some (price contingent) x21 in period two.
We therefore study very simple contracts where agent one receives a certain amount of
period one consumption (denoted ε) against a price contingent quantity of x21 (denoted
δε(q)). Thus the contracts (z1, z2(q)) we study will be of the form [(1 + ε, 1 − ε), ((1 −
δε(q), 0), (δε(q), 1))] for each q in some interval Π, where
(1) (ε, δε(q)) satisfy 0 < ε < 1; 0 < δε(q) < 1, ∀q ∈ Π.
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Following our formulation in the general case in the previous section, we associate to a
contract sΠ the price contingent vector (for p1 fixed at 1),
ξ1((1, q, 1), sΠ) = (1 + ε, [α(1− δε(q)), (1− α)q(1− δε(q))]) and
ξ2((1, q, 1), sΠ) = (1− ε, [β
q
+ βδε(q), (1− β) + q(1− β)δε(q)]), ∀(q, 1) ∈ P2.
For an efficient contract, it suffices to equate the marginal rates of substitution across
the two agents between x11 and x21 evaluated at the price contingent vector ξ
i((1, q, 1), sΠ),
i = 1, 2 associated with the contract sΠ. The efficiency condition
MRS1x11x21(ξ
1((1, q, 1), sΠ)) = MRS
2
x11x21
(ξ2((1, q, 1), sΠ))
holds under the condition 1−δ
ε(q)
1+ε
=
1
q
+δε(q)
1−ε . Thus for efficiency one solves this to get
(2) δε(q) =
k(ε)− 1
q
1+k(ε)
with k(ε) ≡ 1−ε
1+ε
.
Notice that for q > 1, there exist solutions for ε sufficiently small. Thus there exist
efficient contracts for this configuration.
We now turn to the individual rationality requirement that a contract has to satisfy in
a perfectly contracted equilibrium. In the absence of a contract, the perceived utility level
of agent 1 is u11(ω
1
11) + u
1
2(ξ
1
2((q, 1), (q, 1) · ω12)) which equals α lnα+ (1− α) ln((1− α)q) for
each q ∈ Π. If the contract sΠ is accepted by agent 1, her utility is U1(ξ1((1, q, 1), sΠ)) =
ln(1 + ε) + α lnα(1 − δε(q)) + (1 − α) ln(1 − α)q(1 − δε(q)) for each q ∈ Π. The individual
rationality requirement for agent 1 becomes therefore
(3.1) (1 + ε)2(1 + 1/q) ≥ 2.
An analogous computation for agent 2 yields the condition
(3.2) (1− ε)2(1 + q) ≥ 2
Finally, we turn to the market clearing condition embodied in the definition of a per-
fectly contracted equilibrium. For a second period endowment vector of the form (1 −
δε(q), 0), (δε(q), 1) for agents 1 and 2 respectively, the equilibrium spot price is q = β
1−α+δε(q)(α−β) .
Substituting the formula for δε(q) given in (2) into the formula above and solving gives
(4) q∗ = β[k(ε)+1]+(α−β)
(1−α)[k(ε)+1]+(α−β)k(ε)
In this simplified framework, a perfectly contracted equilibrium is a contract sΠ =
(ε, δε(q)) for a given interval Π = [q, q] such that q > 1, a price q∗ ∈ Π, that together
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satisfy (1) − (4), and an allocation x∗ such that x∗i = ξi((1, q∗, 1), sΠ), i = 1, 2. We now
examine two parametric configurations of this formulation.
Case A. Here we set α = β = 0.8. In this case, q∗ = 4 independently of (ε, δε(q)). Thus for
an interval of prices Π to be part of a perfectly contracted equilibrium, it must necessarily
contain q∗ = 4. Furthermore, every perfectly contracted equilibrium price equals q∗ = 4. We
specify here
(i) Π = [q, q] = [3.1, 5.4] so that q∗ ∈ Π.
(ii) ε = 0.3. Accordingly, k(ε) = 0.538. The condition 0.538 > 1/q > 1/q holds so that the
numerator of δε(q) as specified in (2) is positive and accordingly we have that 0 < δε(q) < 1,
∀q ∈ Π.
(iii) It can be verified that (1 + q)(1− 0.3)2 > 2 and (1 + 1/q)(1 + 0.3)2 > 2 so that (3.1)
and (3.2) hold.
Thus sΠ = (ε, δ
ε(q)) where ε = 0.3 and δε(q) is specified by (2), with q∗ = 4 constitutes a
perfectly contracted equilibrium. The allocation it generates is x∗1 = (1.3, (0.65, 0.65)) and
x2∗ = (0.7, (0.35, 0.35)). The allocation x∗1 = (1.3, (0.65, 0.65)); x∗2 = (0.7, (0.35, 0.35)) is
indeed the Arrow-Debreu allocation for this economy.
The Arrow-Debreu allocation however is not the only allocation that can arise as a
perfectly contracted equilibrium for this economy. The two inequalities lnx111 + ln x
1
21 ≥ lnα
and ln(2 − x111) + ln(1 − x121) + lnαx122 − ln(1 − α)x121 ≥ ln β that are required for a Pareto
optimal allocation to be attainable reduce here (after setting q∗ = 4) to (x
1
11)
2
2
≥ 0.8 and
(2− x111)2 ≥ 0.4 respectively.
Indeed any value of x111 that satisfies the two inequalities generates an attainable alloca-
tion via the Pareto optimality equalities
x111
2−x111 =
x121
1−x121 =
x122
1−x122 . In particular, values of x
1
11
satisfying 1.265 ≤ x111 ≤ 1.365 generates attainable allocations. Any such attainable alloca-
tion can arise as a perfectly contracted equilibrium with respect to Π = [q, q] = [3.1, 5.4] and
q∗ = 4. 
As is well-known, the Arrow-Debreu allocation of the economy arises as a sequential
Radner equilibrium where there is a competitive trade in an asset in period one, that pays in
period two commodities followed by competitive trade in period two in the spot markets for
the two commodities. This conclusion however requires that agents have perfect foresight
of the market clearing spot price in period two. In the parameter configuration of Case
A, this market clearing spot price ratio is always 4 which coincides with the second period
price market clearing price under any perfectly contracted equilibrium. The resemblance is of
course superficial, since contracts in our framework are not competitively traded in period one
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and furthermore agents are not required to anticipate correctly the unique market clearing
price ratio in period two. In Case B below we show that there exist perfectly contracted
equilibrium allocations that are distinct from the Arrow-Debreu allocation and where the
market clearing price ratio in period two at such an equilibrium is distinct from the price
ratio that clears markets in the perfect foresight Radner equilibrium of this economy.
Case B. We set α = 0.8; β = 0.75. With these parameter values, xAD11 = 1.282 and the
Radner equilibrium spot price ratio that supports the Arrow-Debreu allocation, denoted
pR ≡ θ21
θ22
is equal to 3.5882.... As before, set ε = 0.3. Accordingly k(ε) = 0.538. Here too we
set Π = [q, q] = [3.1, 5.4]. We observe that
(i) as before, the condition 0.538 > 1/q > 1/q so that the numerator of δε(q) as specified
in (2) is positive, so that 0 < δε(q) < 1, ∀q ∈ Π.
(ii) furthermore (1 + q)(1− 0.3)2 > 2 and ((1 + 1/q)(1 + 0.3)2 > 2 so that (3.1) and (3.2)
hold.
(iii) by computation, q∗ = 3.5979... ∈ Π.
Thus sΠ = (ε, δ
ε(p)) where ε = 0.3 and δε(q) is specified by (2), with q∗ = 3.5979...
constitutes a perfectly contracted equilibrium.
The perfectly contracted allocation x∗1 and x∗2 is not the Arrow-Debreu allocation for
this economy since we have shown that the xAD11 = 1.282 < x
∗1
11 = 1.3. Also q
∗ = 3.5979... >
3.5882... = pR, where the equilibrium relative price in the period two spot market is pR.
Furthermore, if one sets Π = [q, q̂ ] = [3.59, 5.4], one gets a perfectly contracted allocation
where the Radner equilibrium relative price does not belong to the forecasted price set Π. 
2.4 Perfectly contracted equilibria and Pareto optimal
allocations
In this Subsection we provide a characterization of perfectly contracted allocations. Recall
that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a pair (p′, x′), p′ ∈ RM+N+ such that (i) for each agent
i ∈ I, x′i solves the problem Max ui1(xi1) +ui2(xi2) subject to p′1 ·xi1 + p′2 ·xi2 ≤ p′1 ·ωi1 + p′2 ·ωi2,
and (ii) markets clear in all M +N commodities. We show that every interior Arrow-Debreu
allocation is a perfectly contracted allocation and additionally, there are other Pareto optimal
allocations that are perfectly contracted allocations provided they are interior. The following
is our characterization result.
Theorem Assume that A1 and A2 hold. Every perfectly contracted allocation x∗ such that
x∗  0 is an attainable Pareto optimal allocation.
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Let x  0 be an attainable Pareto optimal allocation. Then x is a perfectly contracted
allocation for some specification of (φi)i∈I . Every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation x′  0
is attainable.
The Theorem establishes that the set of attainable allocations is the set of allocations
that can emerge as perfectly contracted allocations. The proof of the first part of the theorem
is straightforward. In the proof of the second part of the Theorem, we set the support of
φi(p1(x)) to exactly the price p2(x) for each i ∈ I. This is a knife-edge specification, which
is undesirable as it requires that expectations be coordinated on a particular second period
price. This was done for convenience as our interest lay in characterizing allocations that
emerge as perfectly contracted allocations and not in specifying the most general conditions
under which these would obtain. An important reason why perfectly contracted equilibria are
of interest to us is precisely that this requirement on expectations can be relaxed substantially
as we now show.
Given an attainable allocation x, we now define Πx as the set of second period prices to
which expectations of a subset of agents has to be restricted to for x to emerge as a perfectly
contracted allocation. First, by a slight abuse of notation, let I−(x) be the set of agents
for whom one has p1(x) · ωi1 > p1(x) · xi1. Let Πx be a set of second period prices such that
(i) p2(x) ∈ Πx, (ii) the contract sΠx = (x1, z2(p2)), p2 ∈ Πx with z2(p2(x)) = x2, satisfies
Condition (i) of Definition 2 and is efficient at p1(x), and lastly, (iii) Πx ⊇ Π for all Π such
that p2(x) ∈ Π, and the contract sΠ = (x1, z2(p2)), p2 ∈ Π with z2(p2(x)) = x2 satisfies
Condition (i) of Definition 2 and is efficient at p1(x).
Thus Πx is the set of second period prices such that there exists a contract that renders x a
perfectly contracted allocation provided Condition (ii) of Definition 2 is satisfied. Condition
(ii) of Definition 2 is satisfied and the attainable allocation x arises as a perfectly contracted
allocation whenever at the period one price p1(x), each i ∈ I−(x) attaches enough probability
to Πx. Furthermore, it follows from the discussion in Section 4.3 below that for a strongly
attainable allocation x, Πx contains p2(x) as an interior point so that we are able to avoid the
knife-edge specification whereby expectations have to give enough probability to the specific
price p2(x).
Corollary Let x be a strongly attainable allocation. Then there exists a set Πx of sec-
ond period prices containing p2(x) as an interior point such that x is a perfectly contracted
allocation whenever for each i ∈ I−(x), φi(p1(x))(Πx) is large enough.
We note that in the statement above, there is no restriction on the expectations of agents
in I\I−(x) at the period one price p1(x).
Extensions. We briefly mention some extensions of the model studied above.
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1. We briefly consider two alternative versions of the individual rationality requirement.
Our notion of individual rationality requires agents to be at least as well off after agreeing
to a contract as by not contracting, at the prevailing price in period one for each possible
configuration of the price in period two that they contract over. This puts restrictions on
how large the set of second period prices Π they contract over can be. An alternative notion
of individual rationality would dispense with Condition (i) of Definition 2 and instead impose
just Condition (ii) of Definition 2 but require it to hold for all agents and not just the ones
giving up wealth in period one. Thus a contract would then be required to keep an agent
at least as well off as by not contracting in expected utility terms. One may analogously
define a perfectly contracted equilibrium with such a version of individual rationality. Such
a version of individual rationality would give greater flexibility in specifying the set of prices
Π that agents contract over.
A second variant would be one where agents receiving wealth in period one are forced to
transfer a fixed amount to agents who give up wealth in period one if p2 /∈ Π. One would then
require Condition (ii) of Definition 2 to hold for all agents and not just agents in I−(p1, z1).
This alternate formulation would leave the definition of perfectly contracted equilibrium and
the material in the following Subsection unchanged. It would however affect the examples
we present later as some aspects of these would have to be recomputed with the new notion
of individual rationality.
2. It is evident that given a perfectly contracted equilibrium, even if the efficiency criterion
requiring equality of marginal rates of substitution is violated for prices other than p∗2 in Π,
one still gets Pareto optimality. It would appear that one can work with a weaker notion
of efficiency. However, in a decentralized setting, agents cannot be expected to know what
the “right” price p∗2 is, so this is not really a meaningful weakening of the requirement of
efficient contracting. In the setting of decentralized contracting (Section 4.2 below), it may
be more appropriate to treat efficient contracting as a behavioral rule (or as a restriction on
the outcome of the contracting process) and require it to hold for all prices in Π.
3. Given uncertainty over prices, agents may have an incentive to enter into contracts over
prices before exchange occurs in Walrasian markets: this would be a static set up. Then,
two agents would be willing to enter into a contract over prices only if there is enough
heterogeneity of beliefs regarding what prices will prevail in the Walrasian market10. While
there may be trades along these lines, there is no role for price contingent contracts here.
In fact, once a price is realized, one of the agents would necessarily prefer to revert to the
10Consider for simplicity an Edgeowrth box economy with two agents and two goods. One agent believes
the price ratio is going to be less than p and while the other agent believes the price ratio will be higher than
p where p < p. In this case there are trades in the lens between p and p going through the initial endowment
that are mutually acceptable.
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original endowment by annuling the initial contract. In the static model, contracts seem to
require enough heterogeneity of beliefs regarding what price will prevail. In our dynamic
setting, we have contracts over prices even with homogenous expectations because of the
need to transfer wealth intertemporally.
3 Contracts and perfectly contracted equilibria
The previous section showed that every attainable allocation can be realized as a perfectly
contracted allocation provided one is free to specify the expectation functions and choose
appropriate individually rational, efficient contracts. It is evident that for a particular at-
tainable allocation x to emerge as a perfectly contracted equilibrium, the condition on expec-
tations specified in the Corollary in Section 2.4, namely that for each i ∈ I−(x), φi(p1(x))(Π)
be large enough where p2(x) ∈ Π, is also necessary. Here we assume that this condition on
expectations is satisfied. The sufficiency of this condition, as stated in the Corollary, presup-
poses that there is an underlying contracting process that delivers the attainable allocation
as a perfectly contracted allocation. In this section we focus on the contracting process.
In our formulation, the process of contracting over prices is embedded in the Walrasian
adjustment process as follows. Given a period one price p1, the profile of expectation func-
tions (φi)i∈I determines what prices agents expect might prevail in the period two spot
markets. We say the triple (p1,Π, (φ
i)i∈I) forms a contracting problem provided the configu-
ration is such that there exist transfers of numeraire across the two periods that benefit all
agents (with at least one agent doing strictly better) and exhaust potential gains from trade.
Specifically, we say the triple C ≡(p1,Π, (φi)i∈I) forms a contracting problem provided there
exists a non-empty set of contracts that are individually rational (with one agent satisfying
the individually rational allocations with strict inequalities) and efficient at p1. This set of
contracts will be referred to as the set of feasible contracts F(C) ={sΠ|sΠ is individually
rational and efficient at p1} for C. We have shown in Section 2.4 that we can associate
to each attainable allocation a contracting problem. There remains the issue of specifying
which particular feasible contract is chosen. This would depend on the precise institutional
details of the contracting process.11 We take this choice as being summarized by a solution
correspondence g(C) which picks a subset of F(C). This is a reduced form formulation of the
particular contracting process that is used by the agents.
In Subsection 3.1 below, we generalize our example from Section 2.3 to illustrate some
aspects related to the choice of the solution correspondence. We first observe that an arbi-
11In the case where the contract is the outcome of a cooperative process, the contract chosen would depend
on the solution concept used. In the case where a noncooperative method is used to determine the contract,
this would depend on factors like which group of agents move first with a proposal etc.
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trary solution correspondence g(C) need not deliver an attainable allocation as a perfectly
contracted equilibrium. We subsequently consider an example of a perfectly contracted equi-
librium where the solution correspondence is generated using Nash Bargaining.
3.1 The example generalized
In this Subsection, we take as given a solution correspondence g(C) and study the additional
restrictions that must be satisfied for an attainable allocation x to emerge as a perfectly
contracted allocation. It is immediate that we need that p1(x) be the period one price
vector, that p2(x) belong to Π, and that C ≡(p1(x),Π, (φi)i∈I) form a contracting problem.
We highlight here the requirement that ∃sΠ ∈ g(C) such that ξi1(p1(x), sΠ) = xi1, ∀i ∈ I.
Indeed for an arbitrary sΠ ∈ F(C), it will not be the case that p1(x) will be a Walrasian
market clearing price for the period one economy where the demands are ξi1(p1, sΠ), ∀i ∈ I.
This problem of market clearing did not appear in the examples studied in the previous
section since there was only one good in period one and no relative price to contend with.
We next generalize the example studied in Section 2.3 to highlight the aforementioned
point. We consider the case where M = {x11, x12}, so that there are two goods in period
one as well and therefore a relative price in period one that will play a role in the analysis.
The set of agents is I = {1, 2}. There are two commodities in period one and two in
period two. Thus M = {x11, x12} and N = {x21, x22}. The endowments are ω11 = (0, 1),
ω21 = (1, 0); ω
1
2 = (1, 0), ω
2
2 = (0, 1); accordingly, ω
1 = ((0, 1), (1, 0)); ω2 = ((1, 0), (0, 1)).
The utilities of the two agents are
U1(x111, x
1
12, x
1
21, x
1
22) = α1 lnx
1
11 + (1− α1) lnx112 + α2 lnx121 + (1− α2) lnx122
U2(x211, x
2
12, x
2
21, x
2
22) = β1 lnx
2
11 + (1− β1) lnx212 + β2 lnx221 + (1− β2) lnx222.
where 0 < α1, α2, β1, β2 < 1. The set of period one prices is P1 = {(p, 1)|p ≥ 0} and the set
of second period prices is, as before, P2 = {(q, 1)|q ≥ 0}. Here too, Π will be an interval of
values of q.
We work with a period one price p, and an interval of second period prices Π = [q,q] such
that p > 1/q > 1/q, assuming that suppφi(p) = Π, i = 1, 2. Here too as before, the agents
can improve over the no contract utility level using a contract under which agent one gets
some x11 in period one and gives up some (a price contingent) x21 in period two. We therefore
continue to study simple contracts where agent one receives a certain amount of period one
consumption (denoted ε ) against a price contingent quantity of x21 (denoted δ
ε(q)). Thus the
contracts (z1, z2(q)) we study will be of the form [((ε, 1), (1− ε, 0)), ((1− δε(q), 0), (δε(q), 1))]
for each q in the interval Π, where (ε, δε(q)) satisfy 0 < ε < 1; 0 < δε(q) < 1, ∀q ∈ Π.
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As before, we impose efficiency by equating the marginal rates of substitution between
x11 and x21 across the two agents and solve for δ
ε(q) to get δε(q) = pq(1−ε)−pε−1
q(p+1)
.
It is evident that there exist solutions (ε, δε(q)) which satisfy 0 < ε < 1; 0 < δε(q) < 1,
∀q ∈ Π.
We ignore the individual rationality requirement for the moment and move directly to
the market clearing conditions that give us a formula for p and another one for q. These are
q = β2
1−α2+δε(q)(α2−β2) and p =
α1
1−β1+ε(β1−α1) . It is evident that unless α2 = β2, q depends on p
via δε(q).
3.1.1 Contract selection
We consider the parametric configuration where α2 = β2 = 0.8 as in Case A earlier and
obtain q = 4 independently of p. We set α1 = 0.9 and β1 = 0.8
First, as an example of the possibility mentioned in Observation 2, we consider a Pareto
optimal allocation x = ((x111, x
1
12), (x
2
11, x
2
12), (x
1
21, x
1
22), (x
2
21, x
2
22)) =
((7/25, 14/95), (18/25, 81/95), (28/109, 28/109), (81/109, 81/109)). This allocation is individ-
ually rational in the “usual” sense since it improves over autarchy. However, it is not attain-
able as it violates the requirement of Definition 5 since U1(x1) = ln(0.06746) < U1x =
ln(0.1425).
Now we consider a Pareto optimal allocation that can emerge as a perfectly contracted
allocation provided a suitable contract is chosen. Take the Pareto optimal allocation x =
((x111, x
1
12), (x
2
11, x
2
12), (x
1
21, x
1
22), (x
2
21, x
2
22)) = ((3/5, 2/5), (2/5, 3/5), (4/7, 4/7), (3/7, 3/7)).Here
U1(x) = ln(0.3292) and U2(x) = ln(0.1859). For this allocation p1(x) = (6, 1), and by com-
putation U1x = ln(0.1152) and U2x = ln(0.1735). Since U i(xi) > U ix, i = 1, 2, this allocation is
attainable. A contract that supports this allocation is ε = 1/2 and δε(4) = 2/7.
For sake of illustration assume that φi(p1(x)), ∀i ∈ I, gives probability one to Π =
{(4, 1)}. It can be verified by computation that C =(p1(x),Π, (φi)i∈I) forms a contracting
problem where F(C) = {(ε, δ(4))|0.25547 ≤ ε ≤ 0.516422; δε(4) = 23−30ε
28
}. (The set F(C)
has been restricted to simple contracts). We now turn to the restriction on the solution
g(C) that we need for x to emerge as a perfectly contracted equilibrium. Indeed for this
to happen, it must be that p1(x) = (6, 1) be market clearing for the period one demand
resulting from the choice of contract. This requires that g(C) admits the contract where
ε = 1/2 and δε(4) = 2/7 from F(C). This configuration of C = (p1(x),Π, (φi)i∈I) and g(C)
verifies the conditions needed for x to emerge as a perfectly contracted allocation.
Remark 1 We have focussed on contracting problems which generate attainable allocations.
There remains the possibility that we have a contracting problem C where p1 is a Walrasian
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market clearing price for the period one economy where the demands are (ξi1(p1, sΠ), sΠ)i∈I ∈
g(C), but that the set of period two prices that clear the market in period two when the
demands are in the set ξi2(p2, sΠ), sΠ ∈ g(C) for each i ∈ I, has an empty intersection with
Π. This would violate Condition (i) in the definition of a perfectly contracted equilibrium
and would typically lead to a non Pareto optimal allocation. It would be natural to term
such a situation a temporary contracting equilibrium. Formally, a temporary-contracting
equilibrium is a triple (p∗, x∗, sΠ) comprising a price vector p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2), an allocation x
∗
and a contract sΠ ∈ g(C) such that (i) x∗i1 = ξi1(p∗1, sΠ), ∀i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I x
∗i
1 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
1, and
(ii) x∗i2 = ξ
i
2(p
∗
2, sΠ), ∀i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I x
∗i
2 =
∑
i∈I ω
i
2 hold. A perfectly contracted equilibrium
is a special case of a temporary-contracting equilibrium where p∗2 ∈ Π. It is straightforward
to generate an example of a temporary-contracting equilibrium using Case A of the example
presented in the previous section. If one specifies an interval Π contained in [q, q] = [3.1, 5.4]
but which excludes the value q = 4, one can rework the example to generate a temporary
contracted equilibrium where the period two market price will not belong to the set of prices
agents had contracted over. We omit the details.
3.1.2 Nash Bargaining
We present an example of a perfectly contracted equilibrium where the solution g(C) is
derived using Nash Bargaining.
In order to simplify the computations we set α2 = β2 = 0.8. This particular param-
eter configuration, as remarked earlier, gives q = 4, independently of p. As a further
simplification we set α1 = β1 = 0.9 to obtain p = 9 for market clearing in period one.
We note that the Arrow-Debreu allocation for this parameter configuration is x1AD =
((9/20, 9/20), (9/20, 9/20)); x2AD = ((11/20, 11/20), (11/20, 11/20)).
We consider a contracting problem C = (9,Π, (φi)i∈I), where 4 ∈ Π, and as before, we
continue to study simple contracts where agent one receives a certain amount of period one
consumption (denoted ε, 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1) against a price contingent quantity of x21 (denoted
δε(q), 0 ≤ δε(q) ≤ 1). Denote the expected utility of selecting the contract defined by a
value ε for the agents as U1(ε) and U2(ε). The expected utility of not contracting and
therefore using the initial endowments ω to generate their Walrasian demands in each of the
two periods are denoted U1, U2. This pair constitutes the threat point of the bargaining
problem. In order to select the contract using Nash Bargaining problem, we formulate the
following problem whose solution defines the Nash Bargaining contract
max
ε∈[ 0,1]
[U1(ε)− U1] · [U2(ε)− U2]
We consider below two specifications of this contracting problem C formulated above.
The computational details are relegated to Appendix F.
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Case A. We consider the case Π = {4} which is the simplest to analyze and assume that each
φi(9)(Π) = 1, i = 1, 2. The efficiency of the contract is requires the condition δε(4) = 7−9ε
8
.
By computation, F(C) ={(ε, δε(4))|0 ≤ ε ≤ 1; 1
8
(1 + 9ε)2 ≥ 1; 9
2
(1− ε)2 ≥ 1; δε(4) = 7−9ε
8
}.
We now turn to the Nash Bargaining solution. To calculate the utility possibility frontier,
we impose the efficiency of the contract, that is, δε(4) = 7−9ε
8
. The indirect utility of an
efficient contract is given by U1(ε) = 2ln 9
10
(ε + 1
9
) and U2(ε) = 2ln 9
10
(1 − ε). This gives
the frontier of the utility possibility set as {(U1,U2)|eU12 + eU22 = 1}. This shows that the
utility possibility set is convex and so the Nash Bargaining solution can be motivated by the
usual axioms. The threat points are computed to be U1 = U1((1/10, 1/10), (4/5, 4/5)) and
U2 = U2((9/10, 9/10), (1/5, 1/5)) respectively.
Finally, the FOC for the Nash Bargaining problem is
9
1 + 9ε
[ln
9
2
+ 2 ln(1− ε)]− 1
1− ε [ln
1
8
+ 2 ln(1 + 9ε)] = 0.
Solving, we get εNB = 0.361828... (details are in Case A of Appendix F).
Under this Nash Bargaining solution, the perfectly contracted equilibrium allocation is
ξ1((p, 1), (q, 1), (ε, δε(q)) = [(0.425645..., 0.425645...), (0.425645..., 0.425645...)] and
ξ2((p, 1), (q, 1), (ε, δε(q)) = [(1−0.425645..., 1−0.425645...), (1−0.425645..., 1−0.425645...)].
We note that the allocation obtained via Nash Bargaining is distinct from the Arrow-
Debreu allocation. This Nash Bargaining solution applies to a continuum economy with
equal masses of the two types of the agents where each agent of type one is matched with
another of type two. It is worth emphasizing that our model admits solutions that remain
different from the Arrow-Debreu model of trade even when there are a continuum of agents,
since going to the continuum does not ensure that our solutions converge to the Arrow-
Debreu solution. This distinction is valid in spite of the fact that agents are subjectively
certain about the spot prices in the period two economy that support the Arrow-Debreu
solution. 
Case B. The previous case dealt with a very restrictive setting where expectations were
concentrated on the singleton set Π = {4}.We now turn to the case where agents expectations
give probability one to an interval of the form Π = [4− σ, 4 + σ], 4 > σ > 0. Specifically, we
assume that φi(9), i = 1, 2, prescribes the probability measure associated with the uniform
distribution over Π = [4− σ, 4 + σ].
By computation, F(C) ={(ε, δε(q)), q ∈ Π|0 ≤ ε ≤ 1; 1
9
[10(4+σ)
5+σ
]
1
2 − 1
9
≤ ε ≤ 1 −
1
3
( 10
5−σ )
1
2 ; δε(q) =
9−9ε(1+ 1
q
)− 1
q
10
}. Then, the Nash Bargaining solution is the maximizer of
the following maximization problem:
max
ε∈F(C)
[U1(ε)− U¯1] · [U2(ε)− U¯2]
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where the details of the expected utilities and the disagreement pair of utilities of agents
are in Case B of Appendix F. Furthermore, one can verify that the utility possibility set is
convex.
We now solve for the Nash Bargaining solution numerically (details are in Case B of
Appendix F). We set σ = 2.25. Then F(C) ={(ε, δε(q)), q ∈ Π|0.2151 ≤ ε ≤ 0.3644; δε(q) =
9−9ε(1+ 1
q
)− 1
q
10
}. In particular we observe that the value of ε that sustains the Arrow-Debreu
allocation is εAD = 7
18
, and it does not belong to F(C). Solving numerically, we get εNB ≈
0.3556 and we obtain the perfectly contracted Nash Bargaining allocation
xNB = ((0.42004, 0.42004), (0.57996, 0.57996), (0.42004, 0.42004), (0.57996, 0.57996)). 
4 A role for financial institutions
Our specification of a solution correspondence g(C) which picks a subset of F(C) assumes
that agents can write individually rational and efficient contracts over the set of prices Π.
This assumption on the contracts over prices implicitly presupposes that there is an economy-
wide coordination mechanism between agents at play. We examine two instances of financial
institutions that may facilitate this coordination and lead to the formation of efficient and
individually rational contracts. The first is a centralized institution which computes efficient
and individually rational contracts for the agents, while the second is a financial institution
which decentralizes the formation of contracts by conducting a trading protocol wherein
agents interact pairwise.
In this section, as in Sections 2 and 3, we assume that spot prices p1 ∈ <M+ and spot
prices p2 ∈ <N+ . Consider a price pair (p1, p2) 0 such that there exist individually rational
and efficient contracts when agents are subjectively certain that the next period price is p2
given the current price p1. Such a price pair is termed contractable. More formally, consider
a price pair such that F(C˜) 6=∅ where C˜≡(p1, Π˜, (φ˜i)i∈I), Π˜≡ {p2} and φ˜i(p1)(Π˜) = 1, ∀i ∈ I.
We term a price pair (p1, p2) contractable if F(C˜) 6=∅, which is equivalent to requiring that
C˜≡(p1, Π˜, (φ˜i)i∈I) is a contracting problem. A contract sΠ ∈ F(C˜) can be identified naturally
with a wealth vector (τ i1, τ
i
2)i∈I which desribes the wealth levels associated with the contract
evaluated at the price pair (p1, p2).
The formation of contracts is done in two steps. Given contractable price pair, we first
determine a contract that is efficient and individually rational. Two instances of this process
are presented below in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2. Next in Subsection 4.3, we extend the
contract to a set of second period prices Π that contains p2 while preserving the efficiency
and individual rationality of the contract.
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4.1 Centralized banking
The efficient and individually rational contracts used in the paper are readily computed by a
centralized financial institution (central bank)12 which elicits the preferences and endowments
of member agents that subscribe to its services and computes efficient and individually
rational contracts for its members by simply maximizing the weighted sum of utilities subject
to the endowment and individually rationality constraints.
We now postulate that a contract is specified by choosing a wealth vector (τ ∗i1 , τ
∗i
2 )i∈I
which solves the following maximization problem (denoted CB) where (p1, p2) is a con-
tractable price pair:
max
{τ i1,τ i2}i∈I
∑
i∈I
θi[ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, τ
i
1)) + u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2, τ
i
2))]
s.t.
∑
i∈I
τ i1 ≤
∑
i∈I
p1 · ωi1∑
i∈I
τ i2 ≤
∑
i∈I
p2 · ωi2
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1)) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)) ≤ ui1(ξi1(p1, τ i1)) + ui2(ξi2(p2, τ i2)),∀i ∈ I
where {θi}i∈I  0.
Recall that an attainable allocation x = (x1, x2) 0 is strongly attainable if U i(xi) > U ix
for each i ∈ I. Given a strongly attainable allocation x = (x1, x2)  0, and the supporting
price subvectors p1(x) and p2(x) (interpreted as spot prices)
13, note that we must have
xit = ξ
i
t(pt(x), pt(x) · xit), t = 1, 2.
Consider the attainable allocation x 0 and supporting prices p1(x) 0 and p2(x) 0.
For each i ∈ I, let λ¯it > 0 denote the marginal utility of money in period t, t = 1, 2. Then,
∂ui1(x
i
1)
∂x1,q
− λ¯i1p1,q(x) = 0 and ∂u
i
2(x
i
2)
∂x2,r
− λ¯i2p2,r(x) = 0, so that λ¯i1 =
∂ui1(x
i
1)
∂x1,q
p1,q(x)
and λ¯i2 =
∂ui2(x
i
2)
∂x2,r
p2,r(x)
,
∀i ∈ I, ∀q ∈ N and ∀r ∈M . As, at an attainable allocation, ∂ui2(xi2)
∂x2,r
/
∂ui1(x
i
1)
∂x1,q
=
p2,r(x)
p1,q(x)
, ∀i ∈ I,
∀q ∈ N and ∀r ∈ M , it follows that λ¯i2 =
∂ui2(x
i
2)
∂x2,r
p2,r(x)
=
∂ui1(x
i
1)
∂x1,q
p1,q(x)
= λ¯i1 as required. Therefore, we
let λ¯i > 0 denote the corresponding marginal utility of income for each individual i ∈ I at
an attainable allocation.
12For simplicity, we have assumed that all agents in the economy subscribe to the same bank. In future
work we will extend the model to study the interaction between more than one such financial institution
where each has as its subscribers some partition of agents of the economy.
13(p1(x), p2(x)) ∈ <M+N+ is the supporting price vector for x.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that in addition to A1 and A2, the preferences over consumption
in each period admits a strictly concave utility function representation for each individual
i ∈ I. Given a strongly attainable allocation x  0 and supporting prices p1(x), p2(x) and
marginal utility of wealth (λ
i
)i∈I , there exists an interior solution (τ ∗i1 , τ
∗i
2 )i∈I to CB when
θi = 1
λ
i , ∀i ∈ I. Let the contract sΠ be such that its associated wealth vector is (τ ∗i1 , τ ∗i2 )i∈I .
Then, the outcome of such a contract is the strongly attainable allocation x.
The proposition shows that a strongly attainable allocation can be obtained as the out-
come of an efficient, individually rational contract computed by centralized financial institu-
tion which chooses the weights attached to the preferences appropriately provided all agents
subscribe to its services. Clearly the result ignores any incentive problems that may arise
in the implementation of such a contract. Moreover, the contracting scenario leaves agents
with little control over the specific contract chosen; one way of addressing this issue could be
via endogenizing the (θi)i∈I  0 vector. We do not pursue these possibilities here. Instead,
we examine next a scenario where agents retrade with each other via successive bilateral
matches and thereby exercise control over the final contract chosen.
4.2 Decentralization via bilateral contracting
We now consider a financial institution that restricts itself to conducting a bilateral trading
protocol for its members. Agents are repeatedly matched with one another and this bilateral
contracting process is shown to lead to efficient contracts over prices.
Building on Feldman [1973], we specify the bilateral contracting process as follows.
At the price pair (p1, p2), an allocation (x1, x2) can be bilaterally blocked by the pair of
agents {i, j} if there exists an allocation (y1, y2) such that Uk(ξk1 (p1, p1 · yk1), ξ
k
2(p2, p2 · yk2)) ≥
Uk(ξ
k
1(p1, p1 · xk1), ξk2 (p2, p2 · xk2)), ∀k ∈ {i, j} , with a strict inequality for some k ∈ {i, j} ,
where
∑
k∈{i,j}(y
k
1 , y
k
2) =
∑
k∈{i,j}(x
k
1, x
k
2).
At the price pair (p1, p2), a bilateral move from allocation (x1, x2) to allocation (y1, y2)
satisfies the conditions: (i) no agent is worse-off i.e., Uk(ξk1 (p1, p1 · yk1), ξk2 (p2, p2 · yk2)) ≥
Uk(ξk1 (p1, p1 · xk1), ξk2 (p2, p2 · xk2)), ∀k ∈ I; (ii) (xk1, xk2) = (yk1 , yk2) for all agents but at most
two. At the price pair (p1, p2) and allocation (x1, x2), a bilateral move to allocation (y1, y2)
is desirable for the pair of agents {i, j} if {i, j} blocks (x1, x2) with (y1, y2).
A bilateral rotating contracting pattern is one where agent 1 trades with agent 2, then
with agent 3,..., then with agent I, agent 2 trades with agent 3, then with agent 4, ..., then
with agent I, and so on until agent I − 1 trades with agent I, after the round of trades is
repeated ad infinitum. At the price pair (p1, p2), a bilateral rotating contracting pattern is
admissible if a desirable bilateral move is made whenever such a move exists.
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A contract sΠ = (z1, z2(·)) is bilaterally unimprovable at the price p1 if for some p2 ∈ Π,
the allocation (z1, z2(p2)) is the limit point of an admissible bilateral contracting pattern
at the price pair (p1, p2) starting from endowments ω. Given a contracting problem C such
that F(C) 6=∅, the bilateral contracting correspondence bC(C) associates to the contracting
problem C those elements of F(C) which are bilaterally unimprovable.
We show below that the bilateral rotating contracting pattern applied to a contractable
price pair leads to efficient and individually rational contracts.
Proposition 2 Suppose that in addition to A1 and A2, we have (i) ωi  0, ∀i ∈ I and
(ii) the indifference curves of each individual through <M+N++ do not intersect the boundary
of <M+N+ . If the price pair (p1, p2) is contractable, then bilateral contracting leads to an
efficient, individually rational contract.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that a process of bilateral contracting with an element of
retrading can achieve the required level of coordination for the emergence of efficient, indi-
vidually rational contracts from any arbitrary configuration of contractable prices.
It also describes an explicit contracting process that ensures the non-emptiness of g(C)
(simply set g(C) = bC(C)).
In the example in the previous subsection, we have shown that for a particular attainable
allocation to emerge as a perfectly contracted allocation, a suitable contract that generates
the perfectly contracted allocation must belong to the solution correspondence g(C) being
used in the economy. One possibility is that the solution correspondence is obtained as g(C) =
bC(C). It remains to ensure that bC(C) contains the contract that is needed to implement the
attainable allocation.
We take as given a strongly attainable allocation x 0; its supporting prices p1(x) ∈ <M+ ,
p2(x) ∈ <N+ are a contractable price pair. We show below that there exists a bilateral rotating
contracting pattern applied to a contractable price pair supporting a strongly attainable
allocation that leads to the same strongly attainable allocation.
Proposition 3 Suppose that in addition to A1 and A2, we have (i) ωi  0, ∀i ∈ I, (ii) the
indifference curves of each individual through <M+N++ do not intersect the boundary of <M+N+ ,
and (iii) the preferences over consumption in each period admits a strictly concave utility
function representation for each individual i ∈ I. Given a strongly attainable allocation
x 0, at the supporting prices p1(x), p2(x), the outcome of bilateral contracting contains a
contract that leads to the strongly attainable allocation x.
Remark 2 Although, for concreteness, we assumed that the bilateral contracting pattern
is rotating, it is worth noting that our results would go through if agents were randomly
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matched at each bilateral bargaining round provided, conditional on any history of previous
matches, any pair of agents would be matched with probability one in some subsequent
round: such a property would be satisfied if matching process was i.i.d. across rounds with
each pair of agents having an equal probability of being matched.
4.3 Extension of contract to Π
Propositions 1-3 establish that two different contracting procedures, centralized banking and
decentralized bilateral bargaining, lead to attainable allocations. These results, as well as
the Theorem, rely on an undesirable knife-edge specification of expectations which requires
that expectations be coordinated on a particular second period price. Here we extend these
results by relaxing this requirement on expectations substantially provided we strengthen
the condition of attainability to strong attainability.
In the proof of the first part of the Theorem and in Propositions 1-3, we set the support of
φi(p1) to exactly the price p2 for each i ∈ I. By continuity, the requirement (i) of individual
rationality (Definition 2) will hold at a first period price of p1(x), for a set Π of second period
prices that is close enough to and includes p2(x).
Specifically, given a Pareto optimal allocation x, let B(p2(x), ε) = {p2 ∈ P2|‖p2−p2(x)‖ <
ε}. We are now in a position to state the following lemma:
Lemma Suppose that in addition to A1 and A2, we have (i) ωi  0, ∀i ∈ I; (ii) the
indifference curves of each individual through <M+N++ do not intersect the boundary of <M+N+
and (iii) the utility function of each individual has a non-zero Gaussian curvature. For
some ε > 0 but small enough, given a strongly attainable allocation (x1, x2)  0, it is
possible to construct a contract sΠ = (x1, z2(·)) which is efficient at each price pair (p1(x), p2),
p2 ∈ B(p2(x), ε) and satisfies z2(p2(x)) = x2.
Recall that I−(x) is the set of agents for whom one has p1(x) · ωi1 > p1(x) · xi1. If x is
strongly attainable, then by continuity of the marginal utilities and the continuity of demand
functions, there exists ε > 0 such that I−(x) = I−(p1(x), x1) and furthermore, the Condition
(i) of Definition 2 holds for a set of second period prices Π which contains B(p2(x), ε). Then,
the Condition (ii) of Definition 2 is satisfied whenever φi(p1(x))(B(p2(x), ε)) is large enough
∀i ∈ I−(x). One has therefore that the strongly attainable allocation x arises as a perfectly
contracted allocation whenever at the period one price p1(x), each i ∈ I−(x) attaches enough
probability to a neighborhood of the period two price p2(x). Notice that there is no restriction
on the probability measures forecasted by agents in I\I−(x) at the period one price p1(x).
Therefore, there exists a neighborhood Π of second period prices containing p2(x) such that
x is a perfectly contracted allocation whenever for each i ∈ I−(x), φi(p1(x))(Π) is large
enough.
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Remark 3 It is straightforward to note that a similar result applies starting from an efficient
allocation corresponding to a contractable price pair, i.e., there exists ε > 0 such that if the
contract (allocation) (x1, x2) 0, is efficient at a contractable price pair (p1, p2), it is possible
to construct a contract sΠ = (x1, z2(·)) which is efficient at each price pair (p1, p˜2), p˜2 ∈
B(p2, ε) and satisfies z2(p2) = x2 (we show this explicitly in the proof of the above Lemma).
At (p1, p2), by construction, the individual rationality constraint (Definition 2 (i)) holds for
each i ∈ I (with strict inequality for some i). As utility functions are monotone, without
loss of generality, we may require that at (p1, p2), the individual rationality constraints
hold as a strict inequality holds for all agents. As x2  0 and (ξi1(p1, p1 · xi1), ξi2(p2, p2 ·
xi2))i∈I  0, by continuity of the marginal utilities and the continuity of demand functions,
if ‖p2 − p′2‖ < ε, p2, p′2 ∈ Π for ε > 0 but small enough, there exists a redistribution of
x2 contingent on p
′
2 ∈ Π, denoted by x2 (p′2) with x2 (p2) = x such that for each pair of
agents i, j ∈ I, we have MRSiq,r(ξi(p′, xi (p′2))) = MRSjq,r(ξj(p′, xj (p′2) )), for some q ∈
M, r ∈ N (as long as N has at least two elements) where p′ = (p1, p′2) and ξi(p′, xi(p′2)) =
(ξi1(p1, p1 · xi1(p′2)), ξi2(p′2, p′2 · xi2(p′2))) (See proof of Lemma). Moreover, as the individual
rationality constraints holds as a strict inequality for each i ∈ I at x2 (p2) = x2, as long
as ε > 0 but small enough, the individual rationality constraints (Definition 2 (i)) continue
to be satisfied at each p′ = (p1, p′2). It follows that if the contract (allocation) (x1, x2) 
0, is efficient and individually rational at a contractable price pair p1, p2, there exists a
neighborhood Π of second period prices containing p2 such that the contract can be extended
to Π while preserving efficiency and individual rationality whenever for each i ∈ I−(x),
φi(p1)(Π) is large enough.
Remark 4 In constructing contracts that lead to a strongly attainable allocation x, we have
started with the contractable pair p1(x), p2(x) and then extended the contract to a set Π
containing p2(x). In view of Remark 3, we could alternatively start with a contractable pair
p1(x) and p˜2 where p˜2 is “close” to p2(x) and then extend the contract to a set Π containing
p2(x).
5 Concluding remarks and future research
We have presented a model of trade where agents need not be subjectively certain of period
two spot prices and where intertemporal transfers of wealth are conducted via contracts
that are price contingent. We propose an equilibrium for this model and characterize the
set of interior allocations that can result under this equilibrium. These are a subset of the
set of Pareto optimal allocations and include the interior Arrow-Debreu allocations for the
economy. Our model is one where cooperative solutions (the contracts may be the result of
the application of a cooperative solution concept or some non-cooperative procedure), ex-
pectations, and the Walrasian adjustment procedure may interact and, in principle, generate
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Pareto optimal allocations in the absence of informational asymmetries. The model shows
that the fact that agents cannot predict future prices in itself need not lead to inefficient
resource allocations, provided there is a frictionless contracting process in price contingent
contracts available in the current period that allows agents to exhaust potential gains from
intertemporal trade conditional on particular second period prices arising in the future.
Our requirement of efficient contracting requires an economy wide coordination which is
considerably more complex than the decentralized trade postulated in a competitive asset
market as in the Radner model with perfect foresight; on the other hand, the informational
and computational requirements, the level of coordination on expectations etc that underlie a
perfect foresight equilibrium, are very different and in our view present considerably greater
conceptual challenges. The paper indicates that financial institutions that facilitate the
formation of these contracts, may have relevance in our formulation. Though this paper has
not fully explored this issue, there is presumably a role for such institutions in the model we
have proposed. For instance, it may be of interest to model the financial system using insights
from the recent literature on networks, search and matching and examine conditions which
deliver efficient contracts endogenously. Our financial contracts are modelled as cooperative
procedures and as we give the existence of procedures that give attainable allocations, in the
setting studied in this paper, the existence of a perfectly contracted equilibrium is guaranteed.
However in this paper we have not analysed noncooperative procedures (eg. bargaining
with a fixed protocol). If a fixed noncooperative procedure is adopted, then an existence
result which has as its focus the interaction between a fixed contracting procedure and the
Walrasian adjustment process would be of interest and we intend to pursue this point in
future work.
The presence of informational asymmetries will only exacerbate the problem of writing
contracts that lead to Pareto optimality. One should not in general expect Pareto optimality
with additional informational complexities. However, our model may be useful in formulating
a theory of second best dynamic resource allocation in a more general set up with asymmetric
information; one that does not rely too heavily on agents being able to divine future prices.
In fact, in such settings, as Arrow and Hahn [1999] point out, contracts over prices could
yield welfare gains, an issue that we intend to pursue in future work.
References
[1] Arrow, K.J. [1953], “The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk bearing,”
Review of Economic Studies, 31, pp. 91-96.
[2] Arrow, K.J. and G. Debreu [1954], “Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive econ-
omy,” Econometrica, 22, pp. 265-290.
28
[3] Arrow, K.J. and F. Hahn [1999], “Notes on sequence economies, transaction costs and
uncertainty”, Journal of Economic Theory, 86(2), 203-218.
[4] Bisin, A. and P. Gottardi [1999], “General Competitive Analysis with Asymmetric In-
formation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 87(1), 1-48.
[5] Bisin, A. and P. Gottardi [2006], “ Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selec-
tion,” Journal of Political Economy, 114(3), 485-516.
[6] Cass, D. and K. Shell [1983], “Do Sunspots matter?”, Journal of Political Economy, 91
(2), pp. 193-227.
[7] Debreu, G. [1959], Theory of Value. New York: Wiley.
[8] Feldman, A. [1973], “Bilateral trading processes, pairwise optimality and Pareto opti-
mality,” Review of Economic Studies, 40 (4), pp. 463-473.
[9] Ghosal, S. and H. Polemarchakis [1997], “Nash–Walras equilibria,” Research in Eco-
nomics, 51, pp. 31–40.
[10] Green, J.R. [1973], “Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model
with Spot and Futures Transactions”, Econometrica, 41(6), pp. 1103-1123.
[11] Henrotte, P. [1996], “Construction of the price state space for interrelated securities with
application to temporary equilibrium theory,” Economic Theory, 8, pp. 423-459.
[12] Kelley, J.L. [1955], General Topology, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New
Jersey.
[13] Kurz, M. [1974], “The Kesten-Stigum model and the treatment of uncertainty in equi-
librium theory,” Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, (Balch, M. S., Mc-
Fadden, D. L., Wu, S. Y., eds.), pp. 389-399, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[14] Kurz, M. [1994], “On rational belief equilibria,” Economic Theory, 4, pp. 859-876.
[15] Kurz, M. and H.M. Wu [1996], “Endogenous uncertainty in a general equilibrium model
with price contingent contracts,” Economic Theory, 8, pp. 461-488.
[16] Levich, R. M. [2009], “Why foreign exchange transactions did not freeze
up during the global financial crisis: The role of the CLS Bank”,
http://www.voxeu.org/article/clearinghouse-saved-foreign-exchange-trading-crisis.
[17] Radner, R. [1972], “Existence of equilibrium of plans, prices, and price expectations in
a sequence of markets,” Econometrica, 40, pp. 289-303.
29
[18] Ripple, R. D. [2011], “International Energy Derivatives Markets” in Hunt, L.C., J. Evans
(eds.) [2011], International Handbook on the Economics of Energy, pp. 725-739, Edward
Elgar Publishing.
[19] Svensson, L.E.O. [1981], “Efficiency and speculation in a model with price contingent
contracts,” Econometrica, 49, pp. 131-151.
30
Appendix
A Proof of the Theorem
Let x∗  0 be the perfectly contracted allocation associated with the pair (p∗, sΠ). We first
show that x∗ is Pareto optimal. Our assumptions on the utility functions of the agents and
the requirement x∗  0 ensure that the marginal rates of substitution of every pair of agents
for every pair of commodities are well defined. For each i ∈ I, x∗i1 = ξi1(p∗1, sΠ) is utility
maximizing with respect to the price vector p∗1 and accordingly one has MRS
i
q,q(x
∗i) =
MRSjq,q(x
∗j), ∀i, j ∈ I and ∀q, q ∈ M . Analogously, for each i ∈ I, x∗i2 = ξi2(p∗2, sΠ) is
utility maximizing with respect to the price vector p∗2 and here too one has MRS
i
r,r(x
∗i) =
MRSjr,r(x
∗j), ∀i, j ∈ I and ∀r, r ∈ N .
To establish the Pareto optimality of x∗, it suffices to show that for any pair of agents
i, j and any pair of commodities q ∈ M, r ∈ N, we have MRSiq,r(x∗i) = MRSjq,r(x∗j).
Since sΠ is an efficient contract at p
∗
1, it follows that there exist q ∈ M, r ∈ N, such
that MRSiq,r(x
∗i) = MRSjq,r(x
∗j). The conclusion follows by observing that MRSkq,r(x
∗k) =
MRSkq,q(x
∗k)MRSkq,r(x
∗k)MRSkr,r(x
∗k) for k = i, j.
Next, we show that (x∗1, x
∗
2) is an attainable Pareto optimal allocation. Clearly, (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) is
supported by the price vector (p∗1, p
∗
2) such that p
∗
2 ∈ Π. By the requirement that sΠ satisfies
individual rationality at p∗1 and that p
∗
2 ∈ Π, one has
U i(x∗i) = ui1(x
∗i
1 ) + u
i
2(x
∗i
2 ) = u
i
1(ξ
i
1(p
∗
1, sΠ)) + u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p
∗
2, sΠ))
≥ ui1(ξ
i
1(p
∗
1, p
∗
1 · ωi1)) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p
∗
2, p
∗
2 · ωi2)).
Since x∗1 and x
∗
2 are utility maximizing at p
∗
1 and p
∗
2 respectively, p
∗
1 and p
∗
2 must respectively
coincide with the price subvectors p1 and p2 that support the subvectors x
∗
1 and x
∗
2. Therefore
ui1(ξ
i
1(p
∗
1, p
∗
1 · ωi1)) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p
∗
2, p
∗
2 · ωi2)) = ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1)) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)) = U ix∗
and one has accordingly U i(x∗i) ≥ U ix∗ as required for attainability. This completes the proof
of the first statement of the theorem.
Let x  0 be an attainable Pareto optimal allocation. We show that it is a perfectly
contracted equilibrium allocation for some specification of (φi)i∈I . Recall that the price
subvectors p1(x) and p2(x) support respectively the subvectors x1 and x2. Define for ∀i ∈ I,
φi(p1) as the probability distribution that gives probability one to p2(x), set Π = {p2(x)}, and
consider the contract sΠ = (x1, x2). For each i ∈ I, the price contingent vector ξi(p(x), sΠ) =
(ξi1(p1(x), sΠ), ξ
i
2(p2(x), sΠ)) associated with this contract for p2(x) is indeed (x1, x2). The
triple (p(x), x, sΠ) satisfy Conditions (i)-(iii) of a perfectly contracted equilibrium (Definition
4). It remains to verify at sΠ is efficient and individually rational at p1. By the Pareto
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optimality of (x1, x2) we have that sΠ is efficient at p1(x). Since (x1, x2) is attainable, it
follows that sΠ satisfies Condition (i) of Definition 2. Since φ
i(p1(x)), ∀i ∈ I is the probability
distribution that gives probability one to p2(x), and we have set Π = {p2(x)}, by Observation
1, part (i) of Definition 2 implies part (ii) of Definition 2, and consequently sΠ is individually
rational at p1(x). This completes the proof of the second statement of the theorem.
Let (p′, x′) be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium such that x′  0 and p′ ∈ RM+N+ . Interpreting
p′1, p
′
2 as spot prices, observe that since ξ
i
t(p
′
t, p
′
t ·ωit) solves Max uit(xit) subject to p′t ·xit ≤ p′t ·ωit,
for t = 1, 2, the vector (ξ
i
1(p
′
1, p
′
1 · ωi1), ξ
i
2(p
′
2, p
′
2 · ωi2)) belongs to the Arrow-Debreu budget
set p′1 · xi1 + p′2 · xi2 ≤ p′1 · ωi1 + p′2 · ωi2, ∀i ∈ I. Therefore, U i(x′i1 , x′i2 ) ≥ ui1(ξ
i
1(p
′
1, p
′
1 · ωi1))+
ui2(ξ
i
2(p
′
2, p
′
2 ·ωi2)), ∀i ∈ I. Since x′ is Pareto optimal, the subvectors x′1 and x′2 have supporting
price subvectors which are denoted pt ∈ Pt, t = 1, 2 respectively. By utility maximization, it
must be the case that p′t is proportional to the supporting price subvector pt ∈ Pt, t = 1, 2,
that is, p′t = λtpt, t = 1, 2. Consequently, for each i ∈ I, (ξ
i
1(p
′
1, p
′
1 · ωi1), ξ
i
2(p
′
2, p
′
2 · ωi2)) =
(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1), ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)) and we have U i(x′i) ≥ ui1(ξ
i
1(p
′
1, p
′
1 · ωi1)) + ui2(ξ
i
2(p
′
2, p
′
2 · ωi2)) =
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1))+ ui2(ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)) = U ix′ as required for the attainability of x′. 
B Proof Proposition 1
Given a strongly attainable allocation x = (x1, x2)  0, consider the supporting price sub-
vectors p1(x) and p2(x) interpreted as spot prices. Since A1 holds and p1(x), p2(x) 0, we
know that for all i ∈ I and τ i1, τ i2 > 0, ξi1(p1(x), τ i1) and ξi2(p2(x), τ i2) are interior solutions of
the following maximization problem: Max ui1(x
i
1) subject to p1(x) · xi1 ≤ τ i1 and Max ui2(xi2)
subject to p2(x) · xi2 ≤ τ i2 respectively. Furthermore, two restrictions are binding under
(ξi1(p1(x), τ
i
1), ξ
i
2(p2(x), τ
i
2)). Therefore, we have that for all i ∈ I; q, q′ ∈M and r, r′ ∈ N ,
p1(x) ·
∂ξi1(p1(x), τ
i
1)
∂τ i1
= 1, p2(x) ·
∂ξi2(p2(x), τ
i
2)
∂τ i2
= 1,
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
i
1))
∂x1,q
= λ
i
p1,q(x),
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), τ
i
2))
∂x2,r
= λ
i
p2,r(x),
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
i
1))
∂x1,q
/∂ui1(ξi1(p1(x), τ i1))
∂x1,q′
=
p1,q(x)
p1,q′(x)
and
ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), τ
i
2))
∂x2,r
/ui2(ξi2(p2(x), τ i2))
∂x2,r′
=
p2,r(x)
p2,r′(x)
.
It follows that for each i ∈ I,
∑
q′∈M
1
λ
i
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1 (x) , p1(x) · xi1))
∂x1,q′
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1)
∂τ i1
= 1,
∑
r′∈N
1
λ
i
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2 (x) , p2(x) · xi2))
∂x2,r′
∂ξi2,r′(p2(x), p2(x) · xi2)
∂τ i2
= 1.
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Further, for all i ∈ I, q ∈M and r ∈ N ,
MRSiq,r(ξ
i(p(x), p(x)·xi)) ≡ ∂u
i
1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1))
∂x1,q
/∂ui2(ξi2(p2(x), p2(x) · xi2))
∂x2,r
=
p1,q (x)
p2,r (x)
,
where ξi(p (x) , p(x)·xi) = (ξi1(p1 (x) , p1(x) · xi1), ξi2(p2 (x) , p2(x) · xi2)) .
Let V i(p1(x), p2(x), τ
i
1, τ
i
2) = u
i
1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
i
1)) + u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), τ
i
2)), ∀i ∈ I. Note that for
each i ∈ I, uit(ξit(pt(x), τ it )) is the value function associated with maximization problem
Max uit(x
i
t) subject to pt(x) · xit ≤ τ it , t = 1, 2, and as uit(·) is strictly concave, t = 1, 2,
V i(p1(x), p2(x), τ
i
1, τ
i
2) is strictly concave in τ
i
1, τ
i
2
14 and therefore, CB is a well-defined concave
maximization problem. To check that the Slater condition is satisfied in CB, observe that
by setting τ it = pt(x) · xit > 0, t = 1, 2, the individual rationality constraint is satisfied as a
strict inequality for each i ∈ I (as x is a strongly attainable allocation) so that by continuity
of ξ
i
t(pt(x), τ
i
t ) and u
i
t(·), ∀i ∈ I and t = 1, 2, there exists strictly positive β strictly less than,
but close to one for which all the three constriants in CB are satisfied as strict inequalities
when τ i,βt = βτ
i
t . Therefore, the Slater condition is satisfied and it is possible to use the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions to characterize the solution to CB. To this end, the Lagrangian of
CB is specified as follows:
L =
∑
i∈I
θiV i(p1(x), p2(x), τ
i
1, τ
i
2)− µ1
[∑
i∈I
τ i1 −
∑
i∈I
p1(x) · ωi1
]
− µ2
[∑
i∈I
τ i2 −
∑
i∈I
p2(x) · ωi2
]
+
∑
i∈I
µi
[
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
i
1)) + u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), τ
i
2))− ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · ωi1))− ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · ωi2))
]
where θi = 1
λ
i > 0, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0 and µi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I. Now, consider τ ∗it = pt(x) ·xit > 0, t = 1, 2.
We check that the FOCs characterizing the Kuhn-Tucker are satisfied so that τ ∗it = pt(x) ·xit
14This statement can be derived explicitly as follows. Let τ = λτ ′ + (1 − λ)τ ′′ and x1 = λξi1(p1(x), τ ′) +
(1− λ) ξi1(p1(x), τ ′′). Then, clearly
p1(x) · x1 = λp1(x) · ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
′) + (1− λ) p1(x) · ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
′′) = λτ ′ + (1− λ)τ ′′ = τ
so that
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ)) ≥ ui1(x1)
= ui1
(
λξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
′) + (1− λ) ξi1(p1(x), τ ′′)
)
> λui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
′)) + (1− λ)ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ
′′))
(where the final inequality follows from the strict concavity of ui1(·) ) thus establishing the strict concavity of
ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), τ)) in τ . A symmetric argument establishes that u
i
2(ξ
i
2(p1(x), τ)) is strictly concave in τ . The
strict concavity of V i(p1(x), p2(x), τ
i
1, τ
i
2) in τ
i
1, τ
i
2 for each i follows.
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is the maximum. First, note that as x is a strongly attainable allocation, µi = 0, ∀i ∈ I. At
any solution to the maximization problem (τ ∗i1 , τ
∗i
2 )i∈I  0, we have that
θi
∑
q′∈M
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1 (x) , p1(x) · xi1))
∂x1,q′
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1)
∂τ i1
= µ1.
Now,
θi
∑
q′∈M
λ
i
p1,q′ (x)
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1)
∂τ i1
= θiλ
i ∑
q′∈M
p1,q′ (x)
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1)
∂τ i1
= 1 = µ1.
By a symmetric argument, µ2 = 1. Since ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1) is an interior solution, we
know that
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x),p1(x)·xi1))
∂x1,q
> 0. Further, we can re-write the FOCs as for each i ∈ I,
∑
q′∈M
θi
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1 (x) , p1(x) · xi1))
∂x1,q′
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1)
∂τ i1
= 1,
∑
r′∈M
θi
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2 (x) , p2(x) · xi2))
∂x2,r′
∂ξi2,r′(p2(x), p2(x) · xi2)
∂τ i2
= 1.
As by assumption, θi = 1
λ
i , τ
∗i
t = pt(x) · xit is a maximum; uniqueness follows as each
V i(p1(x), p2(x), τ
i
1, τ
i
2) is strictly concave in (τ
i
1, τ
i
2). It follows that the allocation correspond-
ing to (τ ∗i1 , τ
∗i
2 ) is
(
ξi1(p1(x), p1(x) · xi1), ξi2(p2(x), p2(x) · xi2)
)
i∈I = x. 
C Proof of Proposition 2
Fix a contractable price pair (p1, p2) with p1 ∈ P1 and p2 ∈ Π and the initial endowments ω.
Consider the sequence of allocations
{
ym = (y
1
m, ..., y
I
m)
}∞
m=1
and the corresponding sequence
of utilities
{
Um = (U
1
m, ..., U
I
m)
}∞
m=1
generated by an admissible contracting pattern with
where U im = U
i(ξi1(p1, p1 · yi1,m), ξi2(p2, p2 · yi2,m)), ∀i ∈ I and ∀m ≥ 1; y0 = (ω1, ..., ωI);
U i0 = U
i(ξ
i
1(p1, p1 · ωi1), ξ
i
2(p2, p2 · ωi2)), ∀i ∈ I and U0 =
(
U10 , . . . , U
I
0
)
. By construction each
element in the sequence of allocations {ym}∞m=1 is a feasible allocation. Moreover, as ωit  0,
∀i ∈ I and t = 1, 2 and the indifference curves of each individual through <M++ (respectively,
<N++) do not intersect the boundaries of <M+ (respectively, <N+ ), it follows that {ym}∞m=1 is
contained in a compact subset of <M+N++ .
As ξi1(p1, p1 · yi1,m) (respectively, ξi2(p2, p2 · yi2,m)) is the solution to Max ui1(xi1) subject to
p1 · xi1 ≤ p1 · yi1,m (respectively, the solution to Max ui2(xi2) subject to p2 · xi2 ≤ p2 · yi2,m),
each {ym}∞m=1 is contained in a compact subset of <M+N++ , and by assumption the indif-
ference curves of each individual through <M++ (respectively, <N++) do not intersect the
boundaries of <M+ (respectively, <N+ ), it follows that
(
ξi1(p1, p1 · yi1,m), ξi2(p2, p2 · yi2,m)
) 
34
0 and that these are continuous functions of ym, ∀m ≥ 1; therefore, for each i ∈ I,(
ξi1(p1, p1 · yi1,m), ξi2(p2, p2 · yi2,m)
)
is contained in a compact subset of <M+N++ .
Next, it follows that, by continuity of utility functions, the sequence {Um}∞m=1 is contained
in a compact set. Moreover, by construction, Um ≥ Um−1, ∀m ≥ 1 so that {Um}∞m=1
is an increasing sequence and as every increasing sequence in a compact set converges to
a supremum, it follows that {Um}∞m=1 converges to U = (U
1
, ..., U
I
), the component-wise
supremum of {Um}∞m=1. Then, as the set of feasible allocations is compact, {ym}∞m=1 has
a limit point y. As {ym}∞m=1 is contained in a compact subset of <M+N++ , it follows that
y ∈ <M+N++ and further, by continuity of (ξi1(p1, ·), ξi2(p2, ·))i∈I and utility functions (U i)i∈I ,
U(y) =
(
U1(ξ11(p1, p1 · y11), ξ12(p2, p2 · y12)), . . . , U I(ξI1(p1, p1 · yI1), ξI2(p2, p2 · yI2))
)
= U.
Define  in the set of feasible allocations F as follows. Given any two feasible allocations
x, y, x  y if either (i) y is an immediate predecessor of x in a bilateral contracting pattern
and x is a desirable move from y, or (ii) starting from y, x is the limit point of a sequence of
bilateral moves contained in a bilateral contracting pattern with at least one such move being
desirable. Clearly,  is transitive on F : if x, y, z are all feasible allocations and x  y and
y  z, then by (ii), x  z. Therefore,  is a partial order on F (Kelley [1955], page 13) and
{ym}∞m=1 is a chain under . Therefore, Zorn’s lemma (Kelley [1955], page 33), guarantees
that F has a maximal element. A maximal element in F under  cannot be preceded by
any other element of F under . Therefore, if y is an upper bound of the chain {ym}∞m=1, y
is bilaterally unimprovable.
As y  0 and by assumption that the indifference curves of each individual through <M++
(respectively, <N++) do not intersect the boundaries of <M+ (respectively, <N+ ), by continuity
of (ξi1(p1, ·), ξi2(p2, ·))i∈I ,
(
ξi1(p1, p1 · yi1), ξi2(p2, p2 · yi2)
)
i∈I  0 and hence, it is efficient i.e., for
each pair of agents i, j ∈ I, we have MRSiqr(ξi(p, p · yi)) = MRSjqr(ξj(p, p · yj)), ∀q ∈M and
∀r ∈ N . 
D Proof of Proposition 3
We take as given a strongly attainable allocation x 0; its supporting prices p1(x), p2(x) are
a contractable price pair. Assume that at the price pair p1(x), p2(x) and allocation (y1, y2),
whenever a desirable bilateral move exists for a pair of agents {i, j}, the desirable move that
is implemented is made as follows.
Firstly, starting from any allocation (y1, y2), a contract is specified by choosing a wealth
vector (τ ∗k1 , τ
∗k
2 )k∈{i,j} which solves the following maximization problem (K):
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max
(τk1 ,τ
k
2 )k∈{i,j}
∑
k∈{i,j}
θk[uk1(ξ
k
1 (p1(x), τ
k
1 )) + u
k
2(ξ
k
2 (p2(x), τ
k
2 ))]
s.t.
∑
k∈{i,j}
τ k1 ≤
∑
k∈{i,j}
p1(x) · yk1∑
k∈{i,j}
τ k2 ≤
∑
k∈{i,j}
p2(x) · yk2
2∑
t=1
ukt (ξ
k
t (pt(x), pt(x) · ykt )) ≤
2∑
t=1
ukt (ξ
k
t (pt(x), τ
k
t )), ∀k ∈ {i, j}
where θi = 1
λ
i , ∀i ∈ I.
This is a well-defined concave maximization problem (see the proof of Proposition 1).
Let (y′1, y
′
2), where
∑
k∈{i,j}(y
′k
1 , y
′k
2 ) =
∑
k∈{i,j}(y
k
1 , y
k
2) be such that(
τ ∗k1 = p1(x) · y′k1 , τ ∗k2 = p2(x) · y′k2
)
k∈{i,j}. At the price pair p1(x), p2(x), the allocation (y
′
1, y
′
2)
results from a bilateral move from allocation (y1, y2).
Consider the sequence of allocations {ym}∞m=1 and the corresponding sequence of utilities
{Um}∞m=1 generated by bilateral contracting where a bilateral move is required to be con-
sistent with the maximization problem (K) and y0 = (ωi)i∈I and U0 = (U i(ξi1(p1(x), p1(x) ·
ωi1), ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · ωi2)))i∈I . Following the steps in the proof of Proposition 2, we conclude
that {Um}∞m=1 converges to U = (U1, ..., U I), the component-wise supremum of {Um}∞m=1.
Moreover, each y which is an upper bound of the chain {ym}∞m=1 with U = U(y) is also
bilaterally unimprovable and as y  0,
MRSiq,r(ξ
i(p(x), p(x)·yi)) = MRSjq,r(ξj(p(x), p(x)·yj)) =
p1,q(x)
p2,r(x)
, ∀q ∈M and ∀r ∈ N.
Moreover, at y, pt(x) · yit > 0, ∀i ∈ I and t = 1, 2. Therefore, for each i ∈ I, ξi(p(x), p(x)·yi)
must satisfy the condition that for some λi > 0,
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · yi1))
∂x1,q
− λip1,q(x) = 0, ∀q ∈M
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · yi2))
∂x2,r
− λip2,r(x) = 0, ∀r ∈ N.
Furthermore, we must also have that∑
q′∈M
1
λ
i
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1(x), p1(x) · yi1))
∂x1,q′
ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · yi1)
∂τ i1
= 1,
∑
r′∈N
1
λ
i
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2(x), p2(x) · yi2))
∂x2,r′
ξi2,r′(p2(x), p2(x) · yi2)
∂τ i1
= 1.
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Next, we show that x is an upper bound of the chain. To this end, we begin by setting
λi = λ
i
and show that there exists y such that y = x. Note that, by construction, each y
solves (K) for each pair of agents i, j and moreover, as the individual rationality constraint is
always trivially satisfied at y (so that the associated Lagrangian multiplier can be set equal
to zero for each pair of agents), by adapting the argument and the relevant expressions in
Proposition 1, we must have that∑
q′∈M
θk
∂uk1(ξ
k
1 (p1 (x) , p1(x) · yi1))
∂x1,q′
∂ξk1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · yk1)
∂τ k1
= µij1 ,
∑
r′∈N
θk
∂uk2(ξ
k
2 (p2 (x) , p2(x) · yk2))
∂x2,r′
∂ξk2,r′(p2(x), p2(x) · yk2)
∂τ k2
= µij2 ,
(where k ∈ {i, j} and µijt , t = 1, 2, is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint∑
k∈{i,j} τ
k
t ≤
∑
k∈{i,j} pt(x) · ykt ). Furthermore, fixing agent i ∈ I, note that at each t = 1, 2,
as (K) must have the same solution for any other agent j she is matched with, we have that
µijt = θ
iλ
i
= µt = 1. Moreover, ξ
i
t(pt (x) , pt(x) · yit) must satisfy both the two preceeding
equations and the following two equations∑
q′∈M
1
λ
i
∂ui1(ξ
i
1(p1 (x) , p1(x) · yi1))
∂x1,q′
∂ξi1,q′(p1(x), p1(x) · yi1)
∂τ i1
= 1,
∑
r′∈N
1
λ
i
∂ui2(ξ
i
2(p2 (x) , p2(x) · yi2))
∂x2,r′
∂ξi2,r′(p2(x), p2(x) · yi2)
∂τ i2
= 1
as well. It follows that pt(x) · yit = pt(x) · xit and therefore, ξit(pt(x), pt(x) · yit) = xit so that
yit = x
i
t, ∀i ∈ I and t = 1, 2 (by strict concavity of the utility function of each individual
the maximization problem Max uit(x
i
t) subject to pt(x) ·xit ≤ pt(x) ·xit, has a unique solution
at each t = 1, 2), as required. Further, U = U(x) and for any other upper bound y of the
chain {ym}∞m=1, (i) U(x) = U(y) so that ξi(p(x), p(x)·xi) and ξi(p(x),p(x)·yi) lie on the same
indifference curve for each individual i ∈ I, and (i) further, for each individual i ∈ I,
MRSiq,r(ξ
i(p(x), p(x)·xi)) = MRSiq,r(ξi(p(x),p(x)·yi)) =
p1,q(x)
p2,r(x)
, ∀q ∈M and ∀r ∈ N.
so that as U i(·) is strictly concave, ξi(p(x), p(x)·xi) = ξi(p(x),p(x)·yi) = xi for each i ∈ I.
E Proof of the Lemma
Under A1 and A2, as ωi  0, ∀i ∈ I and the indifference curves of each individual through
<M+N++ do not intersect the boundaries of <M+N+ , both x2  0 and(
ξi1(p1, p1 · xi1) = xi1, ξi2(p2, p2 · xi2) = xi2
)
i∈I  0.
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Pick a pair of commodities m in period one and n in period two. At the attainable
allocation, we have that for all i, j ∈ I, ∂ui1(xi1)
∂x1,m
/
∂ui2(x
i
2)
x2,n
=
∂uj1(x
j
1)
∂x1,m
/
∂uj2(x
j
2)
x2,n
⇔ ∂ui1(xi1)
∂x1,m
/
∂uj1(x
j
1)
x1,m
=
∂ui2(x
i
2)
∂x2,n
/
∂uj2(x
j
2)
x2,n
. Let m(x) =
∂ui1(x
i
1)
∂x1,m
/
∂uj2(x
j
1)
x1,m
. The function defined by
ϕ(x, ω, p2, x2, x
′
2, λ) =

∂ui2(x
i
2)
∂x2
− λip2, i = 1, 2, ..., I
p2 · (xi2 − x′i2 ), i = 1, 2, ..., I
∂u12(x
1
2)
∂x2,n
m(x)− ∂uj2(xj2)
∂x2,n
, j = 2, ..., I∑
i∈I(x
′i
2 − ωi2)
characterizes the conditions for solution that have to met at an efficient contract at each
p2 ∈ B(p2(x), ε) = {p2 ∈ P2|‖p2 − p2(x)‖ < ε}: at p2 ∈ B(p2(x), ε) and the attainable
allocation x, it is necessary and sufficient for an efficient contract that ϕ(x, ω, p2, x2, x
′
2, λ) = 0
for some Lagrangian multipliers λ = (λi)i∈I  0. The dimension of the domain of the
function ϕ is greater than the dimension of its range provided N ≥ 2. Moreover, as long
as the utility function of each individual satisfies the assumption that the utility functions
within each period has a non-zero Gaussian curvature, zero is a regular point for the function
ϕ(x, ω, p2, x2, x2, λ¯) for some Lagrangian multipliers λ¯ = (λ¯
i)i∈I  0. Therefore, if p2 ∈
B(p2(x), ε) for some ε > 0 but small enough, there exists a redistributions of commodities
in period two, x′i2 − ωi2, such that ϕ(x, ω, p2, x2, x′2, λ) = 0 for some Lagrangian multipliers
λ = (λi)i∈I  0.
Finally note that if the starting point is an efficient allocation y that is not attainable,
then the above argument continues to apply if we replace x by y in ϕ(·, ω, p2, x2, x′2, λ). 
F Computational details of Subsection 3.1.2
Case A:
C ≡ (p,Π, (φi)i∈I) = (9, {4}, (φi(9)({4}) = 1)i∈I).
The Walrasian demand with a contract (ε, δε(4)) is
ξ1 = ((9ε+1
10
, 9ε+1
10
), (4(1−δ
ε(4))
5
, 4(1−δ
ε(4))
5
)) and ξ2 = ((9(1−ε)
10
, 9(1−ε)
10
), (4δ
ε(4)+1
5
, 4δ
ε(4)+1
5
)).
Next, the Walrasian demand without a contract is
ξ
1
= (( 1
10
, 1
10
), (4
5
, 4
5
)) and ξ
2
= (( 9
10
, 9
10
), (1
5
, 1
5
)).
Under a contract, MRS1x11,x21(ξ
1) = 9(1−δ
ε(4))
9ε+1
and MRS2x11,x21(ξ
2) = 1+4δ
ε(4)
4(1−ε) . Hence, δ
ε(4) =
7−9ε
8
. Substituting into ξi, i = 1, 2, we get
ξ1 = ((1+9ε
10
, 1+9ε
10
), (1+9ε
10
, 1+9ε
10
)) and ξ2 = ((9(1−ε)
10
, 9(1−ε)
10
), (9(1−ε)
10
, 9(1−ε)
10
)).
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The indirect utility with a contract is
U1(ε) ≡ U1(ξ1) = 2ln9ε+1
10
and U2(ε) ≡ U2(ξ2) = 2ln9(1−ε)
10
.
The indirect utility without a contract (Threat point) is
U¯1 ≡ U1(ξ1) = ln 2
25
and U¯2 ≡ U2(ξ2) = ln 9
50
.
Therefore, by individual rationality,
F(C) = {(ε, δε(4)) | 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1; (1 + 9ε)2 ≥ 8; (1− ε)2 ≥ 2
9
; δε(4) =
7− 9ε
8
}
= {(ε, δε(4)) | 2
√
2− 1
9
≤ ε ≤ 3−
√
2
3
; δε(4) =
7− 9ε
8
}
Using the indirect utility with a contract (U1(ε),U2(ε)), we get the utility possiblity set:
U ≡ {(U1,U2) | eU12 + eU22 ≤ 1} which is convex.
The Nash Bargaining solution is the following:
εNB = arg max
ε∈F(C)
[U1(ε)− U¯1] · [U2(ε)− U¯2]
= arg max
ε∈F(C)
[2ln
9ε+ 1
10
− ln 2
25
] · [ 2ln9(1− ε)
10
− ln 9
50
]
The f.o.c. is 9
1+9ε
[2ln(1−ε)+ ln9
2
]− 1
1−ε [2ln(1+9ε)+ ln
1
8
] = 0. Then, we get εNB ≈ 0.361828.
Accordingly, the perfectly contracted allocation is ξ1 = ((0.425645, 0.425645), (0.425645, 0.425645));
ξ2 = ((0.574355, 0.574355), (0.574355, 0.574355)).
Case B:
C ≡ (p,Π, (φi)i∈I) = (9, [4− σ, 4 + σ], (φi(9)(q) = q+σ−42σ )i∈I), 0 < σ < 4.
As in Case A, we first compute
ξ1(ε, q) = ((
1 + 9ε
10
,
1 + 9ε
10
), (
4(1− δε(q))
5
,
q(1− δε(q))
5
)),
ξ2(ε, q) = ((
9(1− ε)
10
,
9(1− ε)
10
), (
4(1 + qδε(q))
5q
,
(1 + qδε(q))
5
));
ξ
1
(q) = ((
1
10
,
1
10
), (
4
5
,
q
5
)) and ξ
2
(q) = ((
9
10
,
9
10
), (
4
5q
,
1
5
)).
Under a contract, MRS1x11,x21(ξ
1(ε, q)) = 9(1−δ
ε(q))
9ε+1
and MRS2x11,x21(ξ
2(ε, q)) = 1+qδ
ε(q)
q(1−ε) , ∀q ∈
Π. Hence, δε(q) =
9−9ε(1+ 1
q
)− 1
q
10
, for ∀q ∈ Π. Substituting into ξi, i = 1, 2, we get
ξ1(ε, q) = ((
1 + 9ε
10
,
1 + 9ε
10
), (
1 + 9ε
10
4(1 + q)
5q
,
1 + 9ε
10
1 + q
5
)) and
ξ2(ε, q) = ((
9(1− ε)
10
,
9(1− ε)
10
), (
9(1− ε)
10
4(1 + q)
5q
,
9(1− ε)
10
1 + q
5
)).
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Given ∀q ∈ Π, the indirect utility with and without contract are:
U1(ε, q) ≡ U1(ξ1(ε, q)) = 2ln1 + 9ε
10
+ ln(1 +
1
q
) +
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
q
5
U2(ε, q) ≡ U1(ξ2(ε, q)) = 2ln9(1− ε)
10
+ ln(1 +
1
q
) +
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
q
5
U¯1(q) ≡ U1(ξ1(q)) = ln 1
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
q
5
U¯2(q) ≡ U2(ξ2(q)) = ln 9
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5q
+
1
5
ln
1
5
Hence, U1(ε, q)− U¯1(q) = 2ln(1 + 9ε) + ln(1 + 1
q
) + ln 1
10
and U2(ε, q)− U¯2(q) = 2ln(1− ε) +
ln(1 + q) + ln 9
10
.
Since ∂[U
1(ε,q)−U¯1(q)]
∂q
= − 1
q2+q
< 0 and ∂[U
2(ε,q)−U¯2(q)]
∂q
= 1
1+q
> 0, ∀q ∈ Π, in view of individual
rationality, we only need to consider U1(ε, 4 + σ)− U¯1(4 + σ) and U2(ε, 4− σ)− U¯2(4− σ),
which gives
F(C) =
{
(ε, δε(q)), q ∈ Π|0 ≤ ε ≤ 1; (1 + 9ε)2 ≥ 10(4 + σ)
5 + σ
; (1− ε)2 ≥ 10
9(5− σ) ; δ
ε(q) =
9− 9ε(1 + 1q )− 1q
10
}
.
The Nash Bargaining solution is based on the expected utilities of the agents, which are
U1(ε) ≡ Eq[U1(ε, q)] =
∫ 4+σ
4−σ
U1(ε, q) 1
2σ
dq
= 2ln
1 + 9ε
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
1
5
− 1
5
− 2
5σ
[(4 + σ)ln(4 + σ)− (4− σ)ln(4− σ)]
+
1
2σ
[(5 + σ)ln(5 + σ)− (5− σ)ln(5− σ)]
U2(ε) ≡ Eq[U2(ε, q)] =
∫ 4+σ
4−σ
U2(ε, q) 1
2σ
dq
= 2ln
9(1− ε)
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
1
5
− 1
5
− 2
5σ
[(4 + σ)ln(4 + σ)− (4− σ)ln(4− σ)]
+
1
2σ
[(5 + σ)ln(5 + σ)− (5− σ)ln(5− σ)]
U¯1 ≡ Eq[U¯1(q)] =
∫ 4+σ
4−σ
U¯1(q) 1
2σ
dq
= ln
1
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
1
5
− 1
5
+
1
10σ
[(4 + σ)ln(4 + σ)− (4− σ)ln(4− σ)]
U¯2 ≡ Eq[U¯2(q)] =
∫ 4+σ
4−σ
U¯2(q) 1
2σ
dq
= ln
9
10
+
4
5
ln
4
5
+
1
5
ln
1
5
+
4
5
− 2
5σ
[(4 + σ)ln(4 + σ)− (4− σ)ln(4− σ)]
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According to the indirect utility with contract (U1(ε),U2(ε)), we get the utility possible set:
U ≡ {(U1,U2) | eU
1−f(σ)
2 + e
U2−f(σ)
2 ≤ 1}, where f(σ) = 1
2σ
[(5 + σ)ln(5 + σ) − (5 − σ)ln(5 −
σ)]− 2
5σ
[(4 +σ)ln(4 +σ)− (4−σ)ln(4−σ)] + 4
5
ln4
5
+ 1
5
ln1
5
− 1
5
. Similar to Case A, the utility
possible set is convex.
The Nash Bargaining solution is the following:
εNB = arg max
ε∈F(C)
[U1(ε)− U¯1] · [U2(ε)− U¯2]
= arg max
ε∈F(C)
[2ln(1 + 9ε) + ln
1
10
+ c1(σ)− c2(σ)] · [ 2ln(1− ε) + ln 9
10
− 1 + c1(σ)]
where c1(σ) =
1
2σ
[(5 + σ)ln(5 + σ)− (5− σ)ln(5− σ)] and c2(σ) = 12σ [(4 + σ)ln(4 + σ)− (4−
σ)ln(4− σ)].
Setting σ = 2.25, we get εNB ≈ 0.3556. The perfectly contracted allocation is
ξ1 = ((0.42004, 0.42004), (0.42004, 0.42004)); ξ2 = ((0.57996, 0.57996), (0.57996, 0.57996)).

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